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L Introduction
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)' to protect employees and to encourage employers to develop employee benefits programs.2 To decrease the administrative burdens involved
with maintaining benefits plans, ERISA allows an employer to serve the dual

role as both company official and plan administrator.3 Serving in this capacity
becomes complicated, however, when employers make fundamental business
decisions that adversely affect their employees' interests.' This situation subjects employers to conflicting loyalties: A loyalty to do what is in the best
interest of the company, and a fiduciary duty of loyalty to do what is in the
best interest of the employee benefit beneficiary.'
Consider the following hypothetical scenario: In an effort to reduce its
workforce, companyX amends its benefits plan and offers an early retirement
package for a three-month window period. Company X's early retirement
program provides financial incentives to employees who willingly accept

early retirement. Employee Yaccepts the early retirement package and retires.
After the initial window period expires, Company X offers a "sweetened"

early retirement deal for an additional three-month window period which
provides employees with even more financial incentives to retire. At this
time, employee Y discovers that, while she was deciding whether to retire
early, company X was considering whether to offer the "sweetened" early
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
2. See 263 CONG. REc. S15, 762 (1974) (adopting ERISA to balance competing goals
of protecting employee benefits and setting reasonable limitations for employers).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1994) (allowing officer, employee, agent, or other representative to serve as fiduciary); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 (1999) (stating corporation may act as
"named fiduciary" for purposes ofact); Frank P. VanderPloeg,Role-Playing UnderERISA: The
Company as "Employer"and'Fiduciary,"9 DEPAULBUS. L.. 259,267 (1997) (finding ERISA
recognizes "symbiotic relationship" employer has with benefits plans).
4. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1993) ("There is, in other
words, a 'tension between the primary [ERISA] goal of benefitting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs.'" (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 515 (1981))); VanderPloeg, supra note 3, at 273 (discussing actions taken by employers
that are directly hostile to interests of participants).
5. See Siskind v. Sperry Ret Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing employers divided loyalty situation stating that "[employers] are obliged to act, on the one
hand, for the plan's members, so as to secure and make certain that benefits will be available to
them and, on the other hand, for the employer, so as to safeguard the business entity's profits").
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retirement package. Employee Y, ineligible for the "sweetened" early retirement plan, sues employer X and asserts that the employer breached its fiduciary duty to her by failing to disclose its intention to offer a more favorable

early retirement package.
This Note considers whether company X has an affirmative fiduciary
duty to employee Yto disclose the proposed changes in its employee benefit
plan. This question arises out of the current trend in the federal courts to
expand a plan administrator's disclosure duties by emphasizing her fiduciary

obligation to provide material information to plan participants. 6 The tension

between ERISA's dual goals of protecting employee benefits and containing
administrative costs to encourage pension plan formation is at the center of
this controversy.' Developing an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclpse proposed changes in benefits plans protects an employee's pension benefits by
infringing on an employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions!
At this time, the legal community has different opinions regarding how to
maintain ERISA's delicate balance between protecting employee benefits and

encouraging the development of benefits plans when dealing with fiduciary
disclosure responsibilities. 9

6. See Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir.
1995) (emphasizing common law trust doctrine and finding ERISA fiduciary maintains
affirmative duty to disclose when it knows silence might be harmful); Bixier v. Cent. Pa.
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding affirmative duty
to disclose when trustee knows that silence might be harmful); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co.,
919 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (basing decision that ERISA fiduciary has affirmative duty
to convey complete and accurate material information to beneficiary on development of fiduciary duty through common law of trusts); see also Mass. Mut.Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 152 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The legislative history demonstrates that
Congress intended ... to incorporate the fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA....").
7. See supra note 4 (describing tension between Congress's legislative objectives for
ERISA).
8. See Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275,278 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding pre-adoption
disclosure impairs legitimate business goals); Siskind, 47 F.3d at 505 (recognizing that ERISA
exempted plan design functions from fiduciary definition to provide employers with flexibility
and control over benefits plans).
9. See Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 189 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding once
employer seriously considers changes it has affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes to
plan participants), rev'd en banc, 220 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Bins I]; Bryan L.
Clobes,In the Wake ofVarity Corp. v. Howe: AnAffinnativeFiduciaryDuv toDiscloseUnder
ERISA, 9 DEPAULBUS. L.J. 221,236 (1997) (finding it essential to impose upon plan fiduciaries
affirmative duty to disclose material information to protect interests of participants and beneficiaries); Ryan P. Barry, Comment, ERISA 'sPurpose:The Conveyance oflnformationfromTrustee
to Beneficiary, 31 CONN. L. REV. 735, 761-64 (1999) (developing affirmative duty to disclose
from common law of trusts); Steven Davi, Note, To Tell the Truth: An Anatvsis of Fiduciary
DisclosureDuties andEmployee Standing to Assert Claims Under ERISA, 10 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 625, 647 (1995) (supporting affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose because
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Those who support an affirnative fiduciary duty to disclose proposed
changes in benefit plans develop the duty on a foundation of the common law
of trusts and ERISA's purpose of protecting the interests of plan participants."0 To support their position, proponents of the affirmative duty emphasize the extensive development in the federal courts of an ERISA administrator's fiduciary duty to disclose." Recognizing that Congress intended for the
courts to interpret ERISA's fiduciary duties in accordance with the law of
trusts, federal jurisprudence supplemented the disclosure requirements with
a fiduciary obligation not to knowingly deceive plan beneficiaries. 2 Various
federal courts interpreted this obligation as requiring employers to disclose

truthful information, about proposed plan amendments, in response to a plan

participant's questions.' 3 Proponents of the affirmative duty to disclose proemployees' interests in receiving information about future plan amendments outweigh employers' interests in effectuating business objectives); Mary 0. Jensen, Note, SeparatingBusiness
Decisions and Fiduciary Duty in ERISA Litigation?, 10 BYU I PUB. L. 139, 159 (1996)
(supporting continuation of trend toward requiring increased disclosure from ERISA employers
and emphasizing that employer silence about material facts should be considered misleading
communication). But see Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.AL, 220 F.3d 1042,1053 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n
employer's serious consideration of a change to a plan does not, in and of itself, implicate
ERISA's fiduciary duties.") [hereinafter Bins 11]; Bins I, 189 F.3d at 943 (Fernandez, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's finding that employers have affirmative
fiduciary duty to disclose); Edward E. Bintz, FiduciaryResponsibility UnderERISA: Is There
Ever a FiduciaryDuty to Disclose?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 979, 997 (1993) (arguing affirmative
fiduciary duty to disclose would "go well beyond the amount of disclosure needed to protect
participants' interests").
10. See Bins I, 189 F.3d at 934 (emphasizing that fiduciary maintains undivided duty of
loyalty to participants and beneficiaries, and thus employer has affirmative duty to disclose
proposed changes in employee benefits plans); Clobes, supra note 9, at 227 (describing
development of affirmative duty to disclose through common law and primary purpose of
ERISA); Barry, supra note 9, at 761-64 (developing affirmative duty to disclose from common
law of trusts); Jensen, supra note 9, at 157-59 (emphasizing trust law principles requiring
affirmative duty to disclose information known by fiduciary but unknown to beneficiary).
11. See infra Part III (outlining common law development of fiduciary duty to disclose).
12. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (determining that employer's
participation in plan to knowingly and significantly deceive plan's beneficiaries constitutes
breach of fiduciary duty); see also Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d
1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasizing common law trust doctrine and finding ERISA fiduciary maintains an affirmative duty to disclose when it knows silence might be harmful); Bixler
v. Cent Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding affirmative duty to disclose when trustee knows that silence might be harmful); Eddy v.
Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (basing decision that ERISA fiduciary has affirmative duty to convey complete and accurate material information to beneficiary
on development offiduciary duty through common law of trusts).
13. See Hockett v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that material
misrepresentations about future plan offerings constitute breach of fiduciary duties when employer has seriously considered future changes); Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117,
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posed changes believe this obligation is a logical extension of ERISA's fiduciary duty to disclose jurisprudence.14
In the alternative, opponents of the affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose
proposed changes rely on the well-established "two hats doctrine" to support
their position. The two hats doctrine recognizes that employers act as "settlors" and not as "fiduciaries" when amending employee benefits plans.' Under
ERISA, an employer must act in a fiduciary capacity to expose itself to fiduciary obligations; therefore, the federal courts can not impose an affirmative
fiduciary obligation to disclose on an employer when it acts as a settlor and
amends its employee benefits plan.16 In addition, opponents ofthe affirmative
duty to disclose proposed changes emphasize that the two hats doctrine proves
that Congress did not intend to sacrifice an employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions to protect employee benefits.17 Instead, opponents
argue that imposing an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose proposed changes
in employee benefits plans will disrupt ERISA's goal of encouraging the development of employee benefits plans by overburdening employers with administrative costs.'8
122 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding affirmative material misrepresentations about proposed future
changes to employee benefit plan constitute breach of fiduciary duty); Fischer v. Phila. Elec.
Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1538 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating previous case established that plan administrator may not make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants about changes to
benefits plan); Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that plan
administrator may not make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants about
changes in employee benefits plan); Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246,251 (6th Cir.
1993) (determining misleading communications regarding plan administration constitute breach
of fiduciary duty); Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding
that, when seriously considering plan changes, employers have fiduciary duty not to make
misrepresentations to plan participants concerning the plan).
14. See Bins 1, 189 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We see no reason why the duty to
disclose material information... should apply in a case involving affirmative misrepresentations about an existing or proposed plan ... but not in a case involving a participant or beneficiary who fails to ask about a proposed plan." ), rev'd en banc, 220 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000).
15. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 891 (1996) (concluding employer acts
as settlor and not as fiduciary when amending pension plan to adopt early retirement incentives); Amata v. W. Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.3d 1402, 1416-1417 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating ERISA
permits employers to wear two hats, as employer and plan administrator, because employers
only assume fiduciary status when they function in fiduciary capacity).
16. See supraPart IV (developing two hats doctrine).
17. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka, Santo Fe Ry. Co., 520
U.S. 510,516 (1997) (emphasizing employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions);
Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 507 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding two hats
doctrine gives employers flexibility to make important business decisions).
18. See Bintz, supra note 9, at 997 (presenting scenario in which affirmative duty to disclose greatly compromises employers' business objectives); VanderPloeg, supra note 3, at 290
(discussing employers' need to control flow of information to perpetuate legitimate business

goals).
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This Note examines whether ERISA imposes an affirmative obligation
on employers to disclose proposed changes in employee benefits plans. Part
II provides a brief history of pre-ERISA legislation and describes ERISA's
disclosure and fiduciary obligations.19 Part Ill shows how the federal courts
expanded the scope of the fiduciary duty to disclose.2 ° Part IV discusses the
two hats doctrine and its impact on the affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose
proposed changes.2 1 Part V analyzes the problems in the development of an
affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose proposed changes.2' Ultimately, this
Note concludes that imposing an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose on

employers would violate ERISA and infringe upon Congress's goal of encouraging employers' to offer pension benefits.
I

The Statutory Foundation

A. Pre-ERISA Legislation: Interestin Disclosure
During the early 1950s, Congress began to take a sincere look into the

dubious practices surrounding employee benefits plans.' In 1958, Congress
enacted the Welfare Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA) based on the

theory that providing plan participants with complete information about their
benefits plans would allow employees to police the plans themselves without
government interference.24 However, the WPPDA's full disclosure concept
19. See infra Part H (presenting pre-ERISA legislation and ERISA fiduciary and disclosure obligations).
20. See infra Part H[ (discussing federal case law developing affirmative fiduciary duty
to disclose).
21.
See infra Part IV (presenting federal case law supporting employer's ability to make
fundamental business decisions).
22. See infra Part V (analyzing affimnative fiduciary duty to disclose proposed changes
in employee benefits plans).
23. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S. SENATE,
SPECIALCOMM. ONAGiNG, THE EMPLOYEE RETREMENT INCOME SEcuRniYAcT OF 1974: THE
FIRST DECADE 6-25 (1984),in JOHNH. LANGBEIN&BRUCEA. WOrK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 67 (2d ed. 1995) (documenting beginning of benefits plan reform in early 1950s).
24. See id. at 68 (discussing theory of law behind WPPDA). Gordon stated:
The theory of the law was that full disclosure to participants and beneficiaries of the
provisions of their plan and its financial operations would deter abuse ("sunlight
being the best disinfectant") and would enable them to police the plans themselves
without requiring greater Government regulations or interference.
Id.; see also Lawrence Allen Vranka, Jr., Note, Defining the ContoursofERISA Preemptionof
StateInsuranceRegulation: MakingEmployee BenefitPlanRegulation an Exclusively Federal
Concern, 42 VAND. L. REV. 607, 612 n.22 (1989) ("[The WPPDA's] method was compulsory
disclosure and, initially, policing of practices by those interested in the plans." (quoting M.
BERNSTEiN, THE FuTuRE oF PRrvATE PENsiONs 47 (1984))).
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did not provide the benefit plan beneficiaries with adequate protection because the Secretary of Labor lacked the investigative and remedial powers
needed to enforce the WPPDA.' Thus, a legislative committee investigated
the security of employee benefits programs and determined that complete
reliance on the full disclosure concept did not prevent serious abuse in the
managing of employee benefit funds.26
Another decade of congressional research regarding employee benefits
programs culminated in the drafting of the ERISA legislationY Once again,
one of Congress's primary motivations for drafting the legislation was to
ensure that employers fulfill the pension promises made to their employees.'
Additionally, Congress sought to encourage the creation of more benefits
25. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 68 ("[The WPPDA was a greatly diluted version of
the bill that had passed the Senate and deprived the Secretasry of Labor of investigatory and
enforcement powers.").
26. See id. at 69-71 (explaining developments leading to "complete rethinking of the full
disclosure concept as principal means of directly regulating employee benefit plans"). According
to Michael Gordon, three factors brought about the belief that Congress needed to supplement
its full disclosure concept with other safeguard provisions. Id. at 69. First, a private commission
on money and credit examined private pension plans and recommended to President Kennedy
that the WPPDA needed to provide greater supervision over the investment of pension plan
assets. Id. Second, the WPPDA enactment fostered a "torrent of mail" from employees who
mistakenly believed that the new legislation afforded them a remedy for their failure to qualify
for private pension benefits. Id Finally, the closing of the Studebaker automobile plant in South
Bend, Indiana, demonstrated the tragic consequences of maintaining underfunded pension plans.
Id. at 70. After the Studebaker plant closed, about 4,000 employees between the ages of forty
and fifty-nine with at least ten years of service received only fifteen cents on the dollar of their
accrued pension benefits. Id.; see also Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Danger of Ignoring Plain
Meaning: IndividualRelieffor Breach of FiduciaryDuty Under ERISA, 41 WAYNE L. REv.
1233, 1238 (1995) (discussing Studebaker plant closing). These three factors highlighted the
deficiencies of the full disclosure concept and eventually motivated Congress to pass the ERISA
legislation with additional safeguard provisions. Gordon, supra note 23, at 71.
27. See Brauch, supranote 26, at 1237 (stating that Congress enacted ERISA following
decade of congressional work).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994) (announcing Congressional findings). The Congressional findings and declaration of policy states:
The Congress finds that... many employees with long years of employment are
losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in
such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the
soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised
benefits may be endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requisite
funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived
of anticipated benefits . . . and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries... that minimum standards be provided assuring
the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
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plans and to contain the costs of administering those plans. 9 To accomplish
these goals, Congress created a three-pronged regulatory scheme that: (1) outlined reporting and disclosure duties; (2) created standards of conduct and
obligations for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans; and (3) provided avenues for legal remedies and access to the federal courts."
B. The ERISA DisclosureRules
Building on the same concerns prompting the WPPDA disclosure requirements, Congress sought to secure employee benefits by providing plan
participants with access to information regarding their benefit plans.3 1 Congress created a detailed disclosure regime to facilitate the flow of information
from plan administrators32 to plan participants.33 ERISA requires a plan
administrator to provide a summary plan description to each plan participant3 4
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(o) (1994) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of this title to encourage the maintenance and growth of single-employer defined benefit pension plans...
[and] to maintain the premium costs of such system at a reasonable level....").
30. See id. § 1001(b) ("It is... declared to be the policy.., to protect... the interests
of participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and
reporting to participants and beneficiaries ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries ... and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and
ready access to the Federal courts."); VanderPloeg, supra note 3, at 263 (summarizing threepronged regulatory approach created by Congress). Unlike the WPPDA which regulated employee benefits plans solely through full disclosure, the ERISA legislation uses full disclosure
as a single component of a broad regulatory scheme. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994).
31. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 87 (finding origin of ERISA disclosure requirements
in WPPDA); Mathew S. Rotenberg, Comment, ER!SA - Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.:
The Third Circuit"Seriously Considers"the FiduciaryDuty to DisclosePotentialChanges to
an Employee Benefit Plan UnderERISA, 42 VILL.L. REv. 1915, 1921 (1997) (stating that disclosure rules provide employees with information necessary to monitor plan administration and
enforce rights).
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (1994) (defining "plan administrator"). According to
ERISA, a plan administrator is:
(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which
the plan is operated;
(ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor, or
(iii) in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a plan
sponsor cannot be identified, such other person as the Secretary may by regulation
prescribe.
Id. ERISA permits an employer to serve as the plan administrator. Id. § 1108(cX3).
33. See id. §§ 1021-1031 (mandating disclosure of information from plan administrator
to plan participant).
34. See id. § 1002(7) (defining "participant"). A plan participant is:
[A]ny employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such

THE AFFRMATIVE FIDUCIARYDUTY TO DISCLOSE
within ninety days of becoming a participant 5 A summary plan description
must be "calculated to be understood by the average plan participant" and be
"sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprize such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan."3"
Following the initial disclosure, plan administrators must supply an updated
summary plan description to each participant every five years if the plan contains amendments, or every ten years if the plan does not contain amendments.37 A plan administrator also must provide a summary description of
material modifications to the plan or other plan related information within
seven months after the
end of the plan year in which the modification or
38
change was adopted.
In addition to the mandated periodic disclosures, a plan administrator
must keep the latest summary plan description in the principal office of the
administrator to enable a plan participant to have constant access to pertinent
information.39 If a participant or beneficiary gives a plan administrator a
written request, then ERISA requires the plan administrator to provide a copy
of an updated summary plan description.4" Finally, the Secretary of Labor can
require the administrator of an employee benefits plan to furnish a statement
of rights to all participants and beneficiaries receiving benefits under the
plan." By complying with this disclosure regime, a plan administrator ensures
that plan participants have access to information regarding the details of their

employee benefits plans. Along with the creation of a disclosure regime,
ERISA establishes fiduciary standards thatgovem some administrative actions.
employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible
to receive any such benefit.
Id.
35. Id. § 1024(bXIXA).
36. See id. § 1022(aX1) (requiring summary plan description written in language average
participant can understand); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a) (1999) (requiring plan administrators
to exercise "considered judgment and discretion by taking into account such factors as the level
of comprehension and education of typical participants in the plan and the complexity of the
terms of the plan"); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1994) (requiring summary plan description
to contain specific information); Bintz, supra note 9, at 982 & n.7 (listing required disclosure
information in summary plan description).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(bXl) (1994).
38. Id.§§ 1024(aX1)-1024(bX1)(B).
39. See id. § 1024(bX2) (stating that plan administrator must make summary plan description available for examination by any plan participant or beneficiary).
40. See id. § 1024(bX4) (requiring plan administrator to furnish latest updated summary
plan description upon written request of any participant or beneficiary). This provision also
allows an administrator to charge a participant or beneficiary a reasonable amount to cover the
cost of furnishing complete copies. Id.
41. Id. § 1024(c).
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C. The ERISA FiduciaryDuties

Congress created federal fiduciary provisions to combatthe serious abuses
of discretion and management it discovered during its committee investigations.42 ERISA's provisions accomplish two specific purposes by: (1) defining
who is a fiduciary; and (2) establishing fiduciary responsibilities. 3 A person
is a fiduciary with respect to the plan to the extent that she: (1) exercises
control over the management of the plan; (2) renders investment advice; or
(3) maintains discretionary authority over the administration of the plan.'
Labeling a specific individual a "fiduciary" does not automatically subject her

to fiduciary obligations; instead, fiduciary duties attachwhen an individual acts
in one ofthe three designated functions.4"

Serving in a fiduciary capacity subjects the individual or company official to the fiduciary responsibilities detailed in ERISA § 404(a) 6 The "duty
42. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 71 (discussing reasons for implementing fiduciary
standards). One prime example of benefit plan mismanagement uncovered by a congressional
committee concerned George Barasch, the founder of two New Jersey unions. Id. Mr. Barasch,
acting as the trustee of various pension plans, became a millionaire by diverting funds away
from the employee benefit plans associated with the unions into "charitable corporations" in
which he was the organizer and primary shareholder. Id.
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21XA) (1994) (defining fiduciary); id. § 1104 (establishing
fiduciary responsibilities).
44. Id. § 1002(21XA). According to ERISA, a person is a fiduciary with respect to the
plan to the extent that.
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets,
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Id. Noticeably absent from the ERISA definition of a fiduciary is the function of establishing
and amending the employee benefit plan. As this Note will discuss, employers do not act as
statutory "fiduciaries" when performing these functions. See VanderPloeg, supra note 3, at 271
(stating employers who establish and amend plans are not acting as fiduciaries); Part IV (presenting two hats doctrine).
45. See Hozier v. Midwest Fastners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155,1158 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Fiduciary
duties under ERISA attach not just to particular persons, but to particular persons performing
particular functions."); Brauch, supra note 26, at 1239 ("[Fiduciary status] is based upon func-

tion rather than title.").
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(aX1) (1994). This section states:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of:
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of loyalty" is the first of three fiduciary obligations and requires each fiduciary to discharge his duties "solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries."4' Second, a fiduciary must act "for the exclusive purpose of"
providing benefits to plan beneficiaries and defraying administration ex-

penses.4" Finally, fiduciaries have an obligation to exercise the "care, skill,
prudence, and diligence" of a "prudent man acting in like capacity" when
making decisions and exercising authority over the employee benefits plan.49
Enlarging the scope of § 404(a) is the notion that Congress expected the
courts to use the common law of trusts to define the breadth of ERISA's
fiduciary duties.50 The legislative history indicates that "[t]he fiduciary
responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to ...fidu-

ciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."5 In
1984, Justice Brennan used ERISA's legislative history to broaden fiduciary
responsibilities by emphasizing that Congress intended to incorporate trust
principles into ERISA's fiduciary duty standards.52 However, the power to
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims ....
Id.
47. Id. § I 104(aXI); see also Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154,1162 (6th Cir.
1988) (enumerating three components ofERISA's fiduciary requirements).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(aXlXA) (1994).
49. Id. § 1104(aX1)(B); see also Susan P. Scrota, Overview of ERISA Fiduciary Law, in
ERISA FIDUCLARY LAW 19 (Susan P. Scrota ed., 1996) (discussing ERISA imposition of
"prudent man standard" of conduct on fiduciaries); Bintz, supra note 9, at 984 (same). In addition to the functional definition and fiduciary responsibilities, the ERISA fiduciary duty section

requires that plan administrators maintain written instruments outlining the provisions of the
employee benefits plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(aXl) (1994). Also, an employee benefits plan must
include a procedure for amending the plan and for identifying the persons who have authority
to amend the plan. Id. § 1102(bX3).
50. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,496 (1996) (recognizing that fiduciary duties
draw much of their content from common law of trusts); Cent States, Southeast & Southwest

Areas Pension Fund v. Cent Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) ("[Rather than explicitly
enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the
common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility."); Bintz,
supra note 9, at 984-85 (stating ERISA does not enumerate duties of fiduciary, but relies on
common law to define fiduciary responsibilities). But cf Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S.
248, 259 (1993) ("The authority of courts to develop a 'federal common law' under ERISA, is
not the authority to revise the text of the statute." (citation omitted)).
51. H. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4649.
52. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended by § 404(a) to
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expand the fiduciary duty provisions through trust law is limited by ERISA's
legislative history that emphasizes that Congress did modify the trust principles to fit the employee benefits context. 3
D. The RelationshipBetween FiduciaryDuty andDisclosureObligations
ERISA does not directly address the relationship between the general
fiduciary duty and the specific disclosure rules. 4 Some courts refuse to read
an additional disclosure obligation into the fiduciary duty provisions because
ERISA deliberately defined the fiduciary and disclosure obligations in separate sections. 5 InPortov. Armco, Inc.,56 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that compliance with statutory obligations insulated an employer
from a breach of fiduciary duty claim.57 By constuing the fiduciary and
incorporate the fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA.... ."). Justice Brennan stated that
ERISA's legislative history, which incorporated trust principles, required a fiduciary to exercise
a strict duty of loyalty to beneficiaries in the administration and payment of trust benefits. Id.
at 152-53. As this Note will discuss, it was Justice Brennan's proposition that ERISA incorporated trust law into fiduciary standards that permitted courts to develop fiduciary duties to
disclose. See infra Part III (presenting case law using trust principles to extend fiduciary duty
to disclose).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 12-13 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4639,
4650-51 ("It is expected that courts will interpret the prudent man rule and other fiduciary
standards bearing in mind the special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans intended
to be effectuated by the Act ....The principles of fiduciary conduct are adopted from existing
trust law, but with modifications appropriate for employee benefit plans."); Branch, supra note
26, at 1286 (discussing legislative history argument and finding that Congress modified trust
principles to fit employee benefit context).
54. See Bintz, supra note 9, at 988 (finding fiduciary duty and disclosure sections do not
directly address relationship between two rules).
55. See Bd. of Trs. ofthe CWA/ITUNegotiated Pension Plan v. Weinstein, 107 F.3d 139,
147 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding Congress intentionally structured disclosure obligations to limit
categories of documents that administrators must disclose such that disclosure duties are not
extended by general fiduciary duties); Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir.
1987) ("[A]n administrator who complies with the statutory standard for disclosure cannot be
said to have breached the fiduciary duty by not providing earlier disclosure."); see also Faircloth
v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 657 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding precedent does not recognize
general fiduciary obligation under ERISA to provide information related to plan on request).
56. 825 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1987).
57. See Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding administrator that complies with statutory disclosure responsibilities cannot be held to have breached
fiduciary duty to plan participants by not providing earlier disclosure). Upon his retirement,
Porto made an irrevocable decision not to sell his Armeo stock, the company's contribution to
his retirement fund, for a period of five years. Id. at 1275. Before the period expired, Porto's
plan administrator rebuffed Porto's attempt to invoke a sale of his depreciating stock because
the plan regulations did not permit a participant to change his retirement election. Id. Subsequently, a change in the Internal Revenue Code prompted a plan amendment to permit a retired
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disclosure sections separately, the court denied the breach of fiduciary duty
claim.s In a related case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that
Congress intentionally structured disclosure obligations to limit the categories
of documents administrators must disclose.5 9 Therefore, the court deemed it
"inappropriate" to extend specific disclosure obligations through general fiduciary duties." A court that reads the disclosure and fiduciary duty provisions
separately will not find an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in
employee benefit plans.
To develop an affirmative dutyto disclose proposed changes, a court must
expand a plan administrator's disclosure duties through ERISA's fiduciary

duty provisions. ERISA's disclosure obligations do not include an express
duty to inform plan participants of proposed changes to employee benefits
plans.6" The express provision dealing with the disclosure of amendments
requires a plan administrator to disclose a plan change within seven months
after the end of the plan year in which the plan adopted the amendment.62
Because ERISA does not require pre-adoption disclosure, courts developing

an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose proposed changes must rely on trust
law to read ERISA fiduciary duties into the area of disclosure.'

participant to change his retirement election. Id. The plan administrator sent a letter to current
employees advising them of the change but did not inform retired participants until the following year. Id. The court had to determine whether the administrator breached its fiduciary duties
by failing to inform the retired plan participants of the revoeability amendment when the active
participants were informed. Id. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant
because the administrator notified Porto of the amendment in accordance with the time limit
established in the ERISA disclosure rules. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
found that ERISA deals separately with duties to disclose and fiduciary duties. Id. at 1276.
Thus, complying with the statutory standard for disclosure insulates an administrator from a
breach of fiduciary duty claim. Id.
58. Id.
59. See CWA/TU NegotiatedPension Plan, 107 F.3d at 147 (explaining reasons behind
denial of breach of fiduciary duty claim).
60. See id. ("[I]t [is] inappropriate to infer an unlimited disclosure obligation on the basis
of general [fiduciary] provisions that say nothing about disclosure."); see also Faircloth, 91
F.3d at 657 (finding precedent does not recognize general fiduciary obligation under ERISA to
provide information related to plan on request). But see Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d
1005,1012 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[F]iduciary duties operate both independently from and in conjunction with ERISA's specifically delineated requirements.").
61.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994) (articulating disclosure provisions).
62. Id. § 1024(aXl).
63. See id. §§ 1021-1031 (articulating disclosure provisions); Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825
F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding duty to disclose information to plan participants is
"another matter, dealt with separately by ERISA").
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L. DevelopingERISA FiduciaryDuties Through Trust Principles

During the past twenty years, federal courts have used common law trust
principles slowly to enlarge the scope of ERISA's fiduciary obligations.
Initially, the courts expanded fiduciary responsibilities to include the trust law
duty to provide complete and accurate information to plan beneficiaries in
response to employee inquiry.' In Varity Corp. v. Howe, the United States
Supreme Court characterized ERISA's statutory language requiring fiduciaries
to act "solely in the interest of participants" as formulating a duty to deal
fairly and honestly with plan participants. 65 Most recently, the courts have
found that Varity requires employees to provide information regarding "seriously considered" proposed changes in response to an employee inquiry.66

The movement further down the spectrum towards full disclosure culminated
in a Ninth Circuit panel opinion upholding an affirmative fiduciary duty to
disclose proposed changes in employee benefits plans.67
A. Pre-VarityCases: Expounding on Trust Law
The expansion of fiduciary duties into the area of disclosure began when
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that an ERISA fiduciary has
a duty to convey correct and material information to a beneficiary.' In Eddy
64. See Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1261-65 (3d
Cir. 1995) (developing duty not to misinform employees through material misrepresentations
and incomplete disclosures); Bixler v. Cent Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d
1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding duty to disclose when fiduciary knows that silence might
be harmful); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (looking to
common law of trusts to develop fiduciary duty to disclose complete and material information).
65. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (relying on ERISA § 404(a) to
develop fiduciary duty notto lie to plan participants).
66. See Hockett v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that
material misrepresentations about future plan offerings constitute breach of fiduciary duties when
employer has seriously considered future changes); Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d
117, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding affirmative material misrepresentations about proposed future
changes to employee benefit plan constitute breach offiduciary duty); Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co.,
96 F.3d 1533,1538 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding plan administrator may not make affirmative material
misrepresentations to plan participants about changes to benefits plan); Muffins v. Pfizer, Inc.
23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that plan administrator may not make affirmative
material misrepresentations to plan participants about changes in employee benefits plan);
Drennan v. Cen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992) (determining misleading
communications about future changes in benefit plans constitute breach of fiduciary duty).
67. Bins , 220 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000).
68. See Eddy, 919 F.2d at 752 (holding that ERISA fiduciary has affirmative duty to
convey complete and accurate material information to beneficiary); see also Krohn v. Huron
Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542,548 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Eddy as legal foundation for developing
affirmative fiduciary duties to disclose); McAuley v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 165 F.3d 1038,
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v. Colonial Life Insurance Co.69 the D.C. Circuit considered whether the
plaintiff's health insurance provider violated its fiduciary duties by neglecting
to correctly advise him of his rights under his ERISA benefits plan.70 After
learning that his employer planned to terminate his group health insurance
policy, Eddy, an AIDS patient, contacted a Colonial Life representative to
determine whether he could convert his group plan into an individual policy.1
The Colonial Life representative informed Eddy that he could not "convert"
his insurance coverage which left him uninsured. 2 After discovering that he
did, in fact, have a right to convert his insurance coverage, Eddy brought an
action under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty. 3 At a bench trial, a witness
for Colonial Life testified that Eddy did have the right to "convert" his insurance policy, but he could not "continue," his insurance policy.74 The district
1043 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Eddy to support conclusion that ERISA fiduciary has obligation
to disclose relevant information to beneficiary); Joyce v. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp., 126 F.3d
166, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1015 (3d Cir.
1997) (same); Chojnaki v. Ga.-Pao. Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 817 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Shea v.
Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health &
Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv.
Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993) (same).
69. 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
70. See Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747,752 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that
ERISA fiduciary has affirmative duty to convey complete and accurate material information to
beneficiary). In Eddy, the court considered whether the plaintiff's health insurance provider
violated its fiduciary duties by neglecting to correctly advise him of his rights under his ERISA
benefits plan. Id. at 750. Eddy, suffering from the AIDS virus, unknowingly scheduled exploratory surgery for the same day his employer terminated his health insurance coverage. Id. at 748.
Prior to surgery, Eddy contacted his insurance company to ask about his policy's conversion
rights and the insurance company's representative informed him that he did not have the right
to convert his employment based coverage to an individual policy. Id. at 749. In fact, Eddy did
have a right to convert his policy, but the district court denied his claim because it was unclear
whether the plaintiff requested to "convert" his policy, which he could do, or whether he asked
to "continue" his policy, which he could not do. Id. Prior to the appeal, Eddy died from
complications related to theAIDS virus. Id. at 750. The court of appeals found that the insurance
company, an ERISA fiduciary, violated its duty of care to Eddy. Id. Relying on the common law
of trusts, the court determined that an ERISA fiduciary has a duty not to materially mislead a
beneficiary. Id. Because a beneficiary can be misled by silence as well as the spoken word, the
insurance company violated its fiduciary duty by failing to inform Eddy of his ability to convert
his health insurance to an individual policy. Id. at 750-5 1.
71.
Id. at748-49.
72. Id. at 749.
73. Id.
74. Id. "Continuing" coverage occurs when the employer's group policy remains effective
and the insurance company permits a terminated employee to maintain his health insurance. Id.
"Converting" coverage from a group policy to an individual policy occurs when the employer's
underlying group policy is itselfterminated. Id.
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court found for the defendant because the evidence did not sufficiently prove

75
that Eddy correctly asked to "convert," and not to "continue" his policy.

The court of appeals overturned the district court by holding that Colonial
Life had a fiduciary obligation to provide Eddy with correct and complete
material information regarding his status and options. 7 6 From the outset, the
court determined that Congress intended the courts to develop ERISA fiduciary

duties from the common law of trusts. 7' The common law emphasizes that a
trustee has a duty to communicate all material facts affecting the interest ofthe
beneficiary that she needs to know regardless of the precision of her questions. 78 Based on this standard, the court found that once Eddy contacted his
fiduciary and presented his predicament, Colonial Life bore an obligation to
convey complete and accurate material information on his status and options.79
Following Eddy, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals articulated the
standard emphasized by the federal courts when extending fiduciary duties to
include disclosure obligations."0 In Bixler v. CentralPennsylvaniaTeamsters
Health & Welfare Fund 81 the court stated, "[The] duty to inform is a constant
75. Id. at 749. The court's conclusion found that Colonial Life's liability hinged on
whether Eddy asked to "continue" or to "convert" his coverage. Id. According to the court, if
Eddy asked Colonial Life to continue his coverage, then the company did not mislead him
because his policy could not be continued. Id. However, if Eddy asked Colonial Life to convert
his coverage, then the company did mislead him because he could change his group plan into
an individual policy. Id. Overlooking the testimony of Eddy and a co-worker who had a similar
experience, the court found the evidence insufficient to determine which question Eddy asked,
thereby prompting a ruling for the defendant Id.
76. Id. at 750.
77. See id. ("[T]he duties of an ERISA fiduciary are not limited by that statute's express
provisions but instead include duties derived from common law trust principles.").
78. See id. ("[The trustee] is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts
affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not know and
which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection in dealing with a third person." (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959))).
79. See id. at 751 ("Regardless ofthe precision of his questions, once a beneficiary makes
known his predicament, the fiduciary 'is under a duty to communicate... all material facts in
connection with the transaction which the trustee knows or should know.'" (quoting RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt d (1959))).
80. See Bins I, 189 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[The fiduciary duty to disclose] entails
not only a negative duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when the
fiduciary knows that silence might be harmful" (quoting Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health
& Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993))), rev'd en banc, 220 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.
2000); Krohn v. Huron Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Bixier as
foundation for affirmative duty to disclose); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir.
1997) (same); Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255,1262 (3d Cir.
1995) (same).
81. 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993).
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thread in the relationship between beneficiary and trustee; it entails not only
a negative duty not to misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when
the trustee knows that silence might be harmful."82 Two years later, another
Third Circuit Court of Appeals case elaborated on the Bixler holding.8 3
In In re Unisys Corp.Retiree MedicalBenefit "ERISA" Litigation,8 4 the

Third Circuit found that a plan administrator who affirmatively misrepresented the terms of a plan or failed to provide material information to plan
participants violated its fiduciary duties." The court derived a fiduciary duty

not to materially mislead plan participants from ERISA's statutory language
requiring a fiduciary to act "solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries."86 Interpreting Bixier as imposing a responsibility to correctly inform
82. Bixler v. Cent Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir.
1993). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered the extent to which alleged misinformation or failure to provide relevant information constituted a breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA § 404(a). Id. Following the death of her husband, Mrs. Bixler filed suit against the
defendants for failing to provide her with complete information regarding her ability to continue
the family's medical coverage through COBRA. Id. at 1296. After outlining the duties in
ERISA § 404(a), the court followed the lead of Justice Brennan and the Supreme Court and
used trust law to define fiduciary responsibilities. See id. at 1298-99 (citing Mass. Mut Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1985)). Focusing on the Eddy holding, and the
RESTATEmENr (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, the court concluded that a fiduciary has an affirmative duty
to inform when the trustee knows that "silence might be harmful." Id. at 1300. After applying
this standard, the court of appeals determined that the defendants fulfilled their fiduciary duty
to Mrs. Bixler by sending her a written notice regarding the continuation of her husband's
medical coverage under COBRA. Id. at 1302.
83. See Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir.
1995) (recognizing that when plan administrator affirmatively misrepresents plan or fails to
provide material information plan administrator breaches its fiduciary duty).
84. 57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995).
85. See Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir.
1995) (finding that when plan administrator affirmatively misrepresents or fails to provide
material information when it knows its failure to do so may cause harm breaches fiduciary duty).
In this interlocutory appeal, the court considered, inter alia, whether the plaintiffs could maintain
a breach of fiduciary duty claim against their former employer. Id. at 1257. Their employer had
informed retiring employees that medical benefits were for life, but failed to mention that it
reserved the right to terminate the plans for any reason. Id. at 1261. The plaintiffs, a group of
retired workers, left their employment with the understanding that they would receive postretirement medical benefits for life. Id. at 1259. This class of plaintiffs brought an action for
breach of fiduciary duty against their employer after the employer instituted a new medical plan
that required the retirees to pay the full cost of their premiums. IM at 1258-59. The court of
appeals reaffirmed the Bixier holding and emphasized that material misrepresentations aimed at
misleading the reasonable employee constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1264. Because
the defendant knew it could terminate benefits at any time, it breached its fiduciary duty by
consistently informing retiring employees that they maintained lifetime medical benefits and by
allowing employees to make retirement decisions based on those assurances. Id. at 1266.
86. Id. at 1261.
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employees, the court determined that a fiduciary also had an obligation not to
misinform through material misrepresentations or incomplete disclosures."
In addition, the court defined a misrepresentation as "material" if there was a

substantial likelihood that the information would prevent an employee from
making an "adequately informed retirement decision. " ' The Unisys court
firmly expanded an employer's fiduciary duties to include a duty not to misinform through false or incomplete disclosures. 9 One year later, the United
States Supreme Court elaborated on this expansion of ERISA fiduciary duties.

B. Varity Corp. v. Howe: A Duty to Tell the Truth
The Supreme Court, in Varity Corp. v. Howe," derived a fiduciary duty

not to mislead from ERISA's statutory language requiring a fiduciary to act
"solely in the interest ofthe participants."9' 1 Inthis case, the employer, Varity,
87. Id. at 1261-63. The defendants argued that the court should not interpret Bixier as
requiring a broad duty to inform "upon a fiduciary that has satisfied its statutory disclosure
obligations." Id. at 1263; see also supra Part llD (discussing relationship between fiduciary
and disclosure obligations). However, the court dismissed this argument because a fiduciary
can misrepresent the terms of a plan while meeting disclosure obligations. Id. at 1264. Therefore, fulfilling statutory disclosure obligations does not foreclose the possibility that the ERISA
administrator may breach its fiduciary duty by simultaneously or subsequently making material
misrepresentations to plan participants. Id.
88. See id. ("In the present context, a misrepresentation is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee in making an adequately informed
retirement decision.").
89. See id. at 1266-67 (finding that company "actively misinformed its employees by
affirmatively representing to them that their medical benefits were guaranteed once they retired,
when in fact the company knew this was not true"); see also Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv.
Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993) (determining fiduciaries breach duties of loyalty when
they mislead plan participants). Although it is clear that Unisys supports a fiduciary duty not to
mislead, it is not clear that this finding extends to an affirmative duty to disclose proposed
changes in benefits. See Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255,1265
n.15 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that court did not create obligation to predict and disclose future
possibilities or potentialities).
90. 516 U.S. 489 (1993).
91. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,506 (1996) (finding that defendant participating in plan to knowingly and significantly deceive plan's beneficiaries violates fiduciary duty to
act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries"). In Varify, the Supreme Court
decided, inter alia, (1) whether Varity acted in a fiduciary capacity when it misled beneficiaries,
and (2) whether directly misleading beneficiaries regarding the security of their benefits plans
violated the fiduciary obligations thatERISA § 404 imposes on administrators. Id. at492. Varity
instituted a deliberate and elaborate scheme that caused thousands of employees to forfeit their
nonpension benefits. Id. at 493-94. The affected employees brought an action in federal court
against Varity for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 494. Looking to trust law for guidance, the
Supreme Court determined that employers act as plan administrators with fiduciary responsibilities when they exercise powers that the trust document confeired. Id. at 502. Therefore, Varity
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created an elaborate scheme to convince its employees working in its failing
divisions to transfer to a newly incorporated and insolvent subsidiary.' Two

years after the transfer, the subsidiary declared bankruptcy; as a result, thousands of Varity's former employees lost their nonpension benefits.93
The Supreme Court considered, inter alia, whether Varity acted as a
fiduciary when it deceived its employees and whether this misrepresentation
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.94 Initially, the Court had to determine
whether Varity acted as an employer, not constrained by fiduciary obligations,
or as a benefits plan administrator, subject to fiduciary duties, when it enticed
its employees to forfeit their benefits. 95 According to the Court, trust law
provides an administrator with the authority to exercise the powers "appropriate for the carrying out of the purposes" of the trust document. 96 The Court

concluded that Varity acted as an administrator when it deceived employees
because conveying information to plan participants about the future of plan
acted as a fiduciary when it deceived the beneficiaries because providing information about the
future is an exercise of power "appropriate" to carrying out the plan purpose. Id. Also, the
Supreme Court concluded that a fiduciary has an obligation to discharge its duties solely in the
interest of its beneficiaries. Id. at 506. Hence, Varity violated that obligation by knowingly
deceiving the plan's beneficiaries. Id.
92. Id. at 493-94. Later in the opinion, the Supreme Court discussed the details of
"Project Sunshine." The project included: (1) a ninety-second videotaped message from a
Varity vice president assuring the newly created subsidiary's future viability and the security
of the employee pay levels and benefits programs; (2) a document containing a side-by-side
benefits comparison of the companies' benefit plans, (3) a question and answer sheet including
information regarding what will happen to an employee's ERISA welfare or pension benefits;
(4) a transcript of the ninety-second videotaped message; and (5) a cover letter assuring
employees that pension and benefits levels will remain unchanged if they accept employment
at the new company. Id. at 499-501. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that
Varity conveyed a message that "transferring... would not significantly undermine the security
of their benefits." Id. at 501.
93. Id. at 494.
94. Id. at 492.
95. Id. at 498; see also infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA and
ability of company to serve as both "employer" and "fiduciary").
96. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 502 (1996) (quoting 3 AUSTNW. ScoTr &
WILLAM H. FRATCHER, LAW OF TRUSTS § 186, at 6 (4th ed. 1998)). According to the Court,
trust law is a starting point in interpreting ERISA's fiduciary duties, but it does not provide a
dispositive definition. Id. at 497. In addition, the Supreme Court suggested that, when defining
fiduciary duties, courts should take account of
competing congressional purposes, such as Congress' desire to offer employees
enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire
not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation
expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit plans in the
first place.
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benefits is a power "appropriate" for carrying out the purposes of an employee
benefits plan.97
After determining that Varity acted as a fiduciary, the Court quickly
found that its flagrant deceptions constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty of
loyalty.' ERISA § 404(a) states that a fiduciary is to "discharge [its] duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaies. "' Using this standard, the Court found that knowingly participating in
a scheme to deceive the company's plan participants for monetary gain was
not acting in the plan participants' best interests." Therefore, by grossly
misrepresenting the security of its employees' benefits, Varity committed a
breach of fiduciary duty."1' The Varity decision firmly expanded ERISA's
fiduciary duties to include an obligation to deal fairly and honestly with all
plan members. However, the Court specifically declined to consider whether
ERISA imposed a fiduciary duty to disclose "truthfil information on their own
initiative or in response to employee inquiries." Because the Supreme Court
refused to comment on these issues, the lower federal courts maintained the
freedom to continue to extend the fiduciary duty to disclose.
C. Post-Varity: The "SeriousConsideration"Cases
Following Varity, the federal circuits expanded the fiduciary duty to disclose by emphasizing the plan administrator's obligation to deal honestly with
plan participants. At first, the courts emphasized the importance of providing
plan participants with current plan information. InKrohn v. HuronMemorial
Hospital,1 the Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals found that an ERISA fiduciary
has an obligation to respond fully and accurately to employees' inquiries
97. See id. at 503 ("We conclude... that the factual context in which the statements were
made, combined with the plan-related nature of the activity, engaged in by the those who
had plan-related authority to do so, together provide sufficient support for the District Court's
legal conclusion that Varity was acting as a fiduciary."). Elaborating on its holding, the Court
stated that although amending the plan may not be an act of a plan administrator, it does not
follow that communicating with beneficiaries about the future of the plan is beyond the scope
of plan administration. Id. at 505. Employers act as plan administrators when they inform
beneficiaries about the likely future of plan benefits. Id. This distinction becomes important
when considering whether companies have an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in
employee benefit plans. See infra notes 167-89 and accompanying text (presenting two hats
doctrine).
98.
Id. at 506.
99. Id. (quoting ERISA § 404(a)).
100. Id.
101.
Id. The Supreme Court's decision emphasized that fiduciaries have an obligation to
deal fairly and honestly with all plan members. Id.
102.
173 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
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regarding their rights under a current benefits plan. 10 3 Moreover, in Jordanv.
FederalExpress Corp., ° the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that,
absent employee inquiry, employers have an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose material information about currentemployee benefit plans."0 5 With each
case, the f&deral courts expanded employers' disclosure obligations." Ulti103. See Krohn v. Huron Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
defendant breached fiduciary duties by not responding fully and adequately to inquiries about
employee benefits). The Huron plaintiff sustained injuries in an automobile accident and sent
her husband to obtain information from her employer regarding disability benefits. Id. at 545.
According to the plaintiff, the employer's failure to provide her with complete information conceming her disability benefits caused her to forfeit her right to receive long-term disability benefits. Id. at 546. The district court disregarded this argument and granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims. Id. Disagreeing with
the district court's analysis, the court of appeals determined that the defendant did violate its
fiduciary duty to disclose material information to the plaintiff regarding her long-term disability
benefits. Id. at 552. In conjunction with prior affirmative duty cases, the court utilized the
ERISA statutory provisions to determine that fiduciaries have an affirmative obligation to disclose vital information to plan participants. Id. at 547-51. Finding for the plaintiff, the court
concluded that once the plaintiff inquired into her rights under her benefit plan, the defendant
had the responsibility to disclose the availability of the long-term disability benefits. Id. at 551.
104. 116 F.3d 1005 (3d Cir. 1997).
105. See Jordan v. Fed. Express Corp., 116 F.3d 1005, 1007 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that
administrator breached duty to disclose material information even though participant made no
inquiry). In Jordan,the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether a plan administrator's failure to disclose the irrevocability of a retirement benefit election constituted a breach
of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1008. In this case, the company maintained the irrevocability function
in its summary plan description but did not emphasize the prohibition against post-retirement
changes in a letter to the plaintiff discussing the available types of retirement benefits. Id. at
P007. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the
plaintiff failed to state valid claims under ERISA. Id. at 1009.
On appeal, the court considered whether, absent employee inquiry, the plan administrator
maintained an affirmative fiduciary obligation to disclose vital retirement information. Id. at
1014. After enumerating ERISA's fiduciary duties, the court discussed federal disclosure
jurisprudence establishing an affirmative duty for fiduciaries to inform participants of material
information. Id. at 1013-16. Reaffirming the Unisys standard, the court emphasized that a
misrepresentation is material if it precludes a prospective retiree from making an "adequately
informed retirement decision." Id. at 1015-16. Because an omission may rise to the level of
materiality, the court concluded that the defendant had an affirmative fiduciary duty, irrespective of whether the plaintiff inquired into irrevocability, to disclose all material information
regarding his retirement options. Id. at 1015; see also Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th
Cir. 1997) (finding that ERISA fiduciary has duty to speakwhen silence might be harmful).
106. See Krohn, 173 F.3d at 550 (concluding that plan administrator has "affirmative duty
to inform when [it]
knows that silence might be harmful" (quoting Bixler v. Cent Pa. Teamsters
Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993))); Jordan, 116 F.3d at 1015
(emphasizing fiduciary has affirmative duty to disclose material information); Shea v. Esensten,
107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that HMO must disclose financial incentive structure
to ERISA beneficiaries).
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mately, the affirmative duty to give current plan information to plan participants provided the foundation for the courts to develop a fiduciary obligation
to inform participants of proposedplan changes.
For the past decade, federal courts consistently have required employers
to respond honestly and completely to employees' inquiries regarding proposed plan benefits."° Employee inquiries into proposed benefits plans often
arise in an early retirement context.1" For the lower courts, the primary diffi-

culty in applying Varity's material misrepresentation test to the early retirement context was defining the point in time at which failing to disclose a
proposed early retirement plan constituted a deceitful misrepresentation. 1°9

In response to this question, the federal courts developed the "serious consideration" test.
In 1996, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals developed the "serious
consideration" standard to define the point in time when misrepresentations
regarding potential plan amendments rise to the level ofmateriality.11 ° Accord107. See Hockeft v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing previous
holding that material misrepresentations about future plan offerings constitute breach of
fiduciary duties when employer has seriously considered future changes); Ballone v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding affirmative material misrepresentations
about proposed future changes to employee benefit plan constitute breach of fiduciary duty);
Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1538 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding plan administrator may
not make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants about changes to benefits
plan); Mullins v. Pfizer, 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that plan administrator
may not make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants about changes in
employee benefits plan); Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992)
(determining misleading communications about future changes in benefit plans constitute
breach of fiduciary duty); Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154,1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that when seriously considering plan change employers have fiduciary duty not to
make misrepresentations to plan participants concerning the plan offering).
108. Many employers, seeking to reduce their workforce, offer groups of employees special
early retirement benefits if they retire within a specified time period, called "the window period."
For a discussion of early retirement window benefits, see JOHNH. LANGBEIN & BRUCEA. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYm BENMr LAW 327 (3d ed. 2000).
109. See Ethan Lipsig et al.,FiduciaryDisclosureObligations,in ERISA FDUcIARYLAW
162 (Susan P. Scrota ed., Supp. 1998) (stating that duty to avoid affirmative misrepresentations
poses "thorny legal and practical issues" like determining when duty arises).
110. See Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996) (articulating three
part test for determining when benefit proposal is under "serious consideration"). Serious
consideration provides guidance to employers when communicating with employees, but is not
applicable to the affirmative duty scenario that requires employers to disclose proposed changes
to benefits plans without employee inquiry. Regardless of whether an employer is seriously
considering a proposed amendment, employers are not subject to an affirmative fiduciary duty
to disclose because they are not acting as fiduciaries when they amend employee benefits plans.
See infra Part IV.A.-C (discussing employers acting as setlors when amending employee benefits plans).
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ing to the Third Circuit, employers have an obligation not to misrepresent the
status of proposed changes when: "(1) a specific proposal (2) is being discussed for purposes of implementation (3) by senior management with the
authority to implement the change.""' Based on this standard, once an employer begins "seriously considering" proposed changes in benefits plans it

must disclose the existence of the changes upon employee inquiry.'
The cases defining the "serious consideration" standard applied in conjunction with the federal jurisprudence emphasizing the affirmative duty to
disclose current plan information provide a foundation for the affirmative duty
to disclose proposed changes. The affirmative duty cases rely on the common

law of trusts that require a trustee to affirmatively disclose material informa-

tion that is harmful to a beneficiary's interests." 3 Because the "serious consideration" standard defined a point when information becomes "material," the
courts could combine the two legal standards to require an employer "seriously considering"4 proposed changes to voluntarily provide the information
to its employees."
D. The Affirmative FiduciaryDuty to Disclose ProposedChanges
Some practitioners and judges argue that an affirmative fiduciary duty
to disclose proposed changes in employee benefits plans is the next logical
step in the common law development of ERISA fiduciary duties.' A panel
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only court to impose an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in employee benefit programs. Even
though an en banc court later reversed the decision, Bins v. Exxon Company
111. See Fischer, 96 F.3d at 1539 (defining "serious consideration" standard). But see Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1997) (disregarding "serious consideration" standard and developing multiple factor test to determine whether employer affirmatively misrepresented status ofproposed changes).
112. See Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F3d 264,272 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying "serious
consideration" test and finding that no early retirement plan under consideration when plaintiff
retired; therefore, defendant did not affirmatively mislead plaintiff by telling him that "no
material changes affecting his benefits plan were being considered").
113. See supra Part I.C.1 (presenting cases discussing affirmative duty to disclose).
114. See infra Part ILD (discussing Ninth Circuit opinion deriving affirmative duty to disclose out of common law oftrusts and prior federal precedent).
115. See Bins I, 189 F.3d 929,939 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding once employer seriously considers changes it has affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in employee benefits plans),
rev'd en banc, 220 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000); Clobes, supra note 9, at 236 ("It is essential that
courts heed the lessons of Varity and impose upon plan fiduciaries an affirmative duty to disclose material information."); Barry, supra note 9, at 761-64 (developing affirmative duty to
disclose from common law of trusts); Jensen, supra note 9, at 159 (supporting continuation of
trend toward requiring increased disclosure from ERISA employers emphasizing that employer
silence about material facts should be considered misleading communication).
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US.A. (Bins )116 serves as an example of the legal argument supporting an
affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose proposed changes."1 After working for
Exxon U.S.A. (EUSA) for fifteen years, the Bins Iplaintiffdecided to retire.'
Prior to retiring, the plaintiff inquired into rumors that the company, in an
effort to reduce its workforce, might institute a lump sum retirement incentive
to supplement regular retirement benefits under its Special Program of Severance llowances (SPOSA)." 9 Six different individuals withinthe company all
denied having any knowledge of a SPOSA offering.12 ° Relying on this information, the plaintiff retired, and within two weeks of his retirement, EUSA
publicly announced the availability of a lump sum retirement incentive."'
After the announcement, the plaintifffiled suit contending that EUSA breached
its duties as an ERISA fiduciary.' 22
The court of appeals found that once EUSA began "seriously considering" a proposal to offer an enhanced severance package, it not only had a duty
to answer the plaintiffs questions in a straightforward manner, but also had
an affirmative duty to provide information regardless of whether ERISA
beneficiaries ask specific questions."n The court emphasized that "[t]he core
obligation of an ERISA fiduciary is to 'discharge [its] duties with respect to
116. 189 F.3d 929 (9th Cr.1999).
117. See Bins I, 189 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that once employer-fiduciary
seriously considers proposal to change ERISA benefits, it has affirmative duty to disclose
information about plan), rev'd en banc, 220 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000). InBins I, the court
addressed whether an employer had a duty to tell a retiring employee that the company was
seriously considering a proposal that contained enhanced retirement opportunities. Id. at 931.
While considering retirement, six company officials informed an ERISA beneficiary that the
company was not considering offering an enhanced retirement plan. Id. at 932-33. However,
two weeks after the plaintiff's retirement, the company did offer a sweetened retirement
package. Id. at 933. According to the court, the company violated its fiduciary duty to disclose
proposed changes in employee benefits programs because ERISA fiduciaries must always act
in the best interest of the beneficiaries. Id. at 934. When an employer seriously considers
offering a more generous retirement package, it knows that such information is extremely important to any beneficiaries considering retirement Id. at 939. Therefore, the court found that
once an employer-fiduciary seriously considers a proposal to change a benefits program, it has
an affirmative duty to disclose information about that plan to all individuals for whom the
employer knows, or has reason to know, that the information is material. Id. But see Bins v.
Exxon Co., 198 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir 2000) (ordering case to be reheard en banc).
118. BinsI,189F3dat932.
119. See id.(discussing SPOSA ERISA benefit plan permitting EUSA to pay special severance benefits to employees as means of reducing its workforce).
120. See id. (finding plaintiff questioned his two immediate supervisors, assigned benefits
counselor, human resources advisor, Exxon attorney, and his supervisor's supervisor about
possible impending SPOSA offering).
121. Id. at 933.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 934.
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a plan solely in the interest ofthe participants and beneficiaries." 124 According to the court, an ERISA fiduciary does not suspend its duty of loyalty to a
beneficiary when amending an employee benefits plan." Therefore, the duty
of loyalty requires an employer-fiduciary to provide information about potential changes to benefit programs to enable beneficiaries to make informed
decisions about continued employment.'26
Based on the duty of loyalty, the court determined that once ERISA
fiduciaries have material information regarding a benefit plan, they have an
affirmative obligation to provide beneficiaries with the information regardless
of whether employees inquire into proposed changes."2 7 The court emphasized that other federal circuits found an affirmative duty to disclose current
plan information128 and a fiduciary duty to disclose seriously considered proposed changes when asked about the plan.129 Not wanting to penalize the
individual who fails to ask the right questions, the court extended an affrative duty to disclose proposed changes. 3 '
The court supported an affirmative duty by stating that "[a]n employer
seriously considering a proposal to offer more generous retirement or severance benefits knows that such information is material to plan participants who
are making plans to retire.""' Because the fundamental duty ofERISAfiduciaries is to protect the beneficiary's interests, the court found it necessary to
124. Id.(quoting ERISA § 404(aX1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994)).
125. See id. at 936 ("The employer, when acting as a fiduciary, has an undivided duty of
loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries of the plan. The employer's need to operate efficiently as a business should play no role in determining when the employer has an obligation to
communicate with employees about a proposed change in benefits."). The "when acting as a
fiduciary" language is the critical fallacy in the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Employers do not act as
fiduciaries when amending employee benefits plans to develop early retirement programs. See
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 891 (1996) (finding employers amending pension plans
act as settlors and not as fiduciaries). The Ninth Circuit failed to determine whether the defendant
acted in a fiduciary capacity before imposing an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose. See infra
Part IVA (discussing distinction found in ERISA between acting as fiduciary and acting as

settlor).
126. See Bins I, 189 F.3d 929,934 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489, 502-03 (1996) (stating that information regarding future of benefit plans falls within
ERISA's statutory definition of fiduciary act)), rev'd en banc, 220 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000).
127. Id. at939.
128. See id. (citing Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1997)
(stating when ERISA fiduciaries make false stipulations regarding future benefits and beneficiaries rely on guarantees to their detriment employer breaches fiduciary duty)).
129. See id. (citing Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 94 .3d 1533,1537 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding
once ERISA fiduciary is seriously considering proposed changes to employee benefit program
it has duty to answer accurately participant inquiries into prospective plan)).
130. See id. (finding rule would penalize employees who work far away from corporate
headquarters because they do not have access to informal sources of information).
131. Id.
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enforce a blanket disclosure rule to ensure that employees have access to
information they need to make important decisions. 32 Thus, the court held that
once an employer reaches the serious consideration threshold, ERISA fiduciaries have an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in the employment
benefits program to all beneficiaries to whom the employer knows that the
information is material. 33 Although the Ninth Circuit panel's opinion is the
first to extend an affirmative duty to disclose, many practitioners also support
this position. However, other practitioners do not agree that ERISA permits
the development of an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes. 3 4
IV The Two Hats Doctrine
The development of an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes is
problematic because it imposes fiduciary duties on an employer when not
acting in a fiduciary capacity. An affirnative duty to disclose proposed
changes requires employers to act in a fiduciary capacity with the responsibility to "act solely in the interest of plan participants" when amending employee
benefits plans.131 This assumption ignores the well-established two hats

doctrine that maintains that employers do not act as fiduciaries when amending employee benefits plans.'36 An employer does not serve as a fiduciary

when it amends a retirement plan; therefore, courts cannot impose an affirmative fiduciary duty on employers to disclose proposed changes to benefits

plans.
132. See id. ("In its role as a business, the employer may wish to keep such information from
the employees who are about to retire, in the hope that they will retire without the lure (and the
expense) of the more generous financial package. But in its role as a fiduciary, the employer is
forbidden to keep that information to itself once it becomes material.").
133. See id. (identifying fiduciary duty as requiring employer-fiduciary to inform employees to whom information is material and to describe proposed changes and how they might
affect beneficiary); see also Wayne v. Pac. Bell, 189 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that
employer-fiduciary that seriously considers proposal to change retirement benefits has affirmative duty to disclose information about ERISA plan).
134. See Clobes, supra note 9, at 236 (finding it essential to impose upon plan fiduciaries
affirmative duty to disclose material information to protect interests of participants and beneficiaries); Barry, supra note 9, at 761-64 (developing affirmative duty to disclose from common law
of trusts); Davi, supra note 9, at 647 (supporting affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose because
employees' interests in receiving information about future plan amendments outweigh employera' interests in effectuating business objectives); Jensen, supra note 9, at 159 (supporting
continuation oftrend toward requiring increased disclosure from ERISA employers and emphasizing that employer silence about material facts should be considered misleading communication).
135. See Bins I, 189 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 1999) (arguing employer does not suspend
fiduciary responsibilities when amending employee benefits plans ), rev'd en bane, 220 F.3d

1042 (9th Cir. 2000).
136.

See infra Part IVA (discussing fiduciary and settlor distinction).
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A. The Legislative Foundation: Settlor v. FiduciaryDistinction
Congress drafted ERISA after a decade of congressional research and
legislative compromise. Although protecting employees' interests was the

primary incentive driving ERISA, Congress had to consider the voluntary

nature of benefits plans when drafting the legislation.137 As a result, Congress
balanced ERISA's primary goal of securing plan benefits with a desire to
encourage the development of employee benefit programs by minimizing plan
costs. 138 This congressional compromise is inherent in all of ERISA's provisions - especially the fiduciary duty sections.
The fiduciary duty provisions are grounded in trust law; however, to protect the balance established between the competing interests of employers and
employees, Congress specifically modified trust law to fit the employee benefit
context. 1 9 Trust law requires a trustee to have an undivided duty of loyalty to
its beneficiaries. 4 ' This type of undivided loyalty does not apply to the em137. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1993) ("There is, in other
words, a 'tension between the primary [ERISA] goal of benefitting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs."' (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 515 (1981))); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4639 ("The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights, but the
committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement plans.").
138. See 263 CONG. REc. S15,762 (1974) ("Congress tried to adopt provisions which strike
a balance between providing a meaningful protection for the employees and keeping within
reasonable limits for employers."); Binlz, supra note 9, at 988-89 (finding that ERISA legislative purpose to protect employees' rights must be balanced by desire to encourage employers
to offer employee benefits plans); Brauch, supra note 26, at 1289 ("Congress acted carefully to
ensure that administrative burdens and costs imposed on employee benefit plans by ERISA were
not so great that they would deter employers from creating or continuing employee benefit
plans."); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,
5167 (discussing ERISA balancing). Representative Ullmann, a ranking majority member of
the House Ways and Means Committee, characterized the dual purposes of ERISA in the following speech:
I want to emphasize that these new requirements have been carefully designed to
provide adequate protection for employees and, at the same time, provide a favorable setting for the growth and development of private pension plans. It is axiomatic to anyone who has worked for any time in this area that pension plans cannot
be expected to develop if costs are made overly burdensome, particularly for
employers who generally foot most of the bill. This would be self-defeating and
would be unfavorable rather than helpful to the employees for whose benefit this
legislation is designed. For this reason, we have been extremely careful to keep the
additional costs very moderate.
Id.
139. See Brauch, supra note 26, at 1286 (finding Congress modified trust principles to fit
employee benefits context); Daniel Fischel & John -LLangbein, ERISA 'sFundamentalContradiction: The Exclusive BenefitRule, 55 U. CHI L. REV. 1105,1117 (1988) (same).
140. 2AAusTNW. ScoTr &WUAMF. FRATCHER, TEE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (4th ed.
1988).
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ployee benefit context because ERISA's prohibited transaction rules allow a
fiduciary also to serve as an officer, employee, agent, or other representative
of a party in interest.' 4' This exception permits a company, when not acting as
a fiduciary, to consider its other legitimate business concerns.' 42 To distinguish
between fiduciary and non-fiduciary activities, Congress defined the specific
instances in which employers are expected to act as fiduciaries.14 3 ERISA
expressly states that an employer acts as a fiduciary only "to the extent" that it
acts in one of the three fiduciary capacities.'" The explicit list of fiduciary
functions fails to mention any acts relating to the establishment and amendment of the employee benefits plan itself.'45 This omission provides the
foundation for the two hats doctrine.

The two hats doctrine recognizes the separation between employer functions - to which no fiduciary duties attach - and plan administrator functions to which fiduciary duties do attach.' 6 Using another trust law analogy, courts
141.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(cX3) (1994) ("Nothing ... shall be construed to prohibit any
fiduciary from - serving as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer, employee, agent, or other
representative of a party in interest."); Fischel & Langbein, supra note 139, at 1128 (describing
§ 408(c)(3) as counterbalancing provision to notion that plans are only drafted for exclusive
benefit of employees). According to Fischel, Congress perpetuated its goal of encouraging the
development of pension plans by giving employers the authority to serve as the plan fiduciary.
Id. at 1127. The alternative, forcing employers to allow employees to choose their own plan
fiduciaries, deprived employers of investment and design authority. Id.; see also Phillips v.
Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding ERISA "envisions that employers will act in a dual capacity as both fiduciary to the plan and as employer"); VanderPloeg,
supra note 3, at 263 (discussing ERISA provisions overriding traditional trust law).
142. See VanderPloeg, supra note 3, at 272-73 (maintaining that statute cannot mandate
that every employer action be for "exclusive benefit" of plan participants). VanderPloeg pointed
out that employers sometimes have to take actions, like terminating benefits plans, that are
directly hostile to the interests ofthe plan beneficiaries. Id. at 273.
143. See supranote 44 (articulating ERISA's definition offiduciary).
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21XA) (1994) (defining when person is ERISA fiduciary). The
statute provides a functional definition of fiduciary stating that a person acts as a fiduciary to
the extent that he or she: (1) exercises any discretionary authority respecting management of
plan assets; (2) renders investment advice; or (3) maintains discretionary authority or responsibility in the administration of plan. Id. The "to the extent" language in the statute greatly limits
the scope of an employer's fiduciary responsibilities. In general, employers do not owe a duty
of loyalty to participants unless they act in one of the three specified capacities. See Barnes v.
Lacy, 927 F.2d 539,544 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing employers assume fiduciary status "only
when and to the extent" that they function in capacity as plan administrators); VanderPloeg,
supra note 3, at 267 (finding ERISA provisions recognize and accommodate employers fiduciary and non-fiduciary roles).
145. See VanderPloeg, supra note 3, at 272 (recognizing fiduciary definition missing functions of establishing and amending plan); see also Johnson v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 19 F.3d 1184,
1188 (7th Cir. 1994) ("One subject conspicuously missing from [ERISA's definition of fiduciary in § 3(21)(A)] is the establishment and amendment ofthe plan itself.").
146. See Amato v. W. Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402,1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985) (creating
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and regulators deem actions such as designing, establishing, amending, and
terminating plans as "settlor" functions.' Asettlor of atrust does nothave the
duty to act solely in the interest of the beneficiaries; therefore, an employer,
acting as a settlor when amending an employee benefit plan, does not have to
act in the best interest of benefit plan beneficiaries. 4 ' Instead, an employer,
acting in a settlor capacity, can act inthe best interest ofthe company. The two
hats doctrine permits the employer to act in its own self interest when adopting,
amending, or terminating an ERISA plan, but requires the employer to act as
a fiduciary, "in the interests of the beneficiaries," when administering an
ERISA plan. 4 9
B. Supreme Court'sDiscussionof the Two HatsDoctrine
In 1995, the Supreme Court adopted the two hats doctrine. In CurtissWright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,"5 ' a unanimous United States Supreme Court
stated that a company does not act in a fiduciary capacity when amending
welfare plans' and an employer retains a general ability to amend or tenninate welfare plans at anytime and for any reason.'52 Then, inLockheed Corp.
"two hats" metaphor). Giving credit to the district court for its genesis, the Second Circuit Court
ofAppeals created the two hats doctrine by stating,
Judge Spizzo concluded that ERISA permits employers to wear "two hats," and they
assume that they assume fiduciary status "only when and to the extent" that they
function in their capacity as plan administrators, not when they conduct business that
is not regulated by ERISA. We agree. [Western Union's] officers acted on behalf
of a corporate employer and not as Plan fiduciaries in amending its pension plan.
Id. (citations omitted).
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3(1) (1959) (defining settlor as individual
who creates trust).
148. See LANGBEEN&WOLK, supranote 108, at673-74.
149. See Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Donmsizing-Employee Rights orEmployer Prerogative?, 2 EMPLOYEERTS.&EMPLOYMENTPOL'YJ. 1, 83 (1998) (discussing two hats doctrine).
150. 514 U.S. 73 (1995).
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994) (defining welfare plan). Awelfare plan is aplan that
provides: "[A] medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits ....
." Id. The other type of
employee benefits plan is a pension plan, which "provides retirement income to employees,
or... results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of
covered employment or beyond." Id. § 1002(2XA).
152. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (stating that
company is free to adopt, amend, or terminate welfare plans for any reason at any time). In
Curtiss-Wright,the Court considered whether a reservation of rights provision satisfied ERISA's
requirement to maintain a procedure for amending a welfare benefits plan. Id. at 75. The
plaintiffs instituted the action in federal district court after Curtiss-Wright terminated their postretirement health care benefits. Id. at 76. Disregarding all of the substantive claims, the district
court found for the plaintiffs because the defendant's summary plan description did not include
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v. Spink,153 the Supreme Court extended its Curtiss-Wrightholding to pension
plans. 1 54 In an effort to reduce its workforce, Lockheed amended its benefits
plan to offer increased pension benefits to employees who would take early
retirement. 5 5 However, to participate in the early retirement program, an
employee had to release any employment related claims he or she might have
against the company."' Because he refused to waive his right to future
claims, the plaintiff retired without taking any extra benefits and instituted an
an amendment procedure. Id. Curtiss-Wright argued on appeal that its reservation of rights
clause constituted a valid amendment procedure, but the court of appeals confirmed the district
court's decision by declaring the clause void for vagueness. Id. at 76-77.
Writing for an unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor determined that the reservation of
rights clause satisfied the ERISA requirements. Id. at 81. Justice O'Connor argued from the
premise that ERISA did not create substantive rights to employer-provided health benefits;
therefore, employers retained the ability to adopt, modif, or terminate welfare plans at any time
and for any reason. See id.at 78 (citing Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th
Cir. 1990)). According to the Court, ERISA requires plan administrators to establish a procedure for amending the benefits plan and to identify the persons with the authority to amend the
plan. Id. Because the ERISA definition of "person" includes companies, stating that "the
company" retained the authority to amend the plan satisfied the identification requirement. Id.
at 78-79. The Court also derived an amendment procedure from the reservation of rights clause
by relying on corporate law principles to supplement the brief statement. Id. at 79-80. By
satisfying both ERISA requirements, the Court determined Curtiss-Wright's reservation of
rights clause did serve as an adequate amendment procedure. Id. at 81.
153.
517 U.S. 882 (1996).
154. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) ("We see no reason why the
rule of Curtiss-Wrightshould not be extended to pension benefit plans."). In Lockheed, the
Court considered, inter alia, whether the defendant acted as a fiduciary when it amended its
benefit plans to create early retirement incentives. Id. at 889-90. This issue arose after the Lockheed Corp. amended its employee benefit plan to create early retirement incentives but conditioned acceptance on waiving employment-related claims against the company. Id. at 885.
Because of the litigation condition, the plaintiff did not take early retirement and instituted an
action against the company claiming the amendments violated an ERISA provision prohibiting
a fiduciary from using plan assets for the benefit ofa party in interest Id at 885-86. The district
court dismissed the lawsuit, but the Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision,
finding that the defendant breached its fiduciary duties when it "purchased" a benefit for the
company by conditioning early retirement benefits on the release of potential claims. Id.
Disagreeing with this outcome, the Supreme Court believed the court of appeals erred by not
initially determining whether fiduciary status existed in the case before it found a breach of
fiduciary duty. Id. at 889. The Court recounted its decision in Curtis-Wrightthat employers do
not assume fiduciary status when adopting, amending, or terminating welfare benefits plans. Id.
at 890. Because ERISA provides a functional definition of fiduciary that does not include plan
design, the Curtiss-Wrightlegal rule should apply to pension plans. Id. at 890-91. Therefore,
the Court found that the defendant acted as a settlor, and not as a fiduciary, when it amended the
pension plan to adopt early retirement incentives and could not be hold to fiduciary standards of
conduct Id. at 891.
155. Id. at 885.
156. Id.
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action against the company for breaching ERISA's duty of care and prohibited
transaction provisions."s
After the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court of appeals reversed the judgment by finding that the plaintiff successfully proved his breach of fiduciary duty claim.' 58 The Supreme Court reversed the judgement of the court of appeals because the defendant was not
1 59
acting as a "fiduciary" when it amended the employee benefits planL
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas concluded that the court of appeals
erred by not determining whether the defendant acted in a fiduciary capacity
before it found a breach of fiduciary duty."e
Crediting Curtiss-Wrightfor establishing the legal standard, the Court
found that when employers amend welfare benefits plans they act as "settlors"
and not as "fiduciaries."16' According to the Court, ERISA's definition of

fiduciary compels this conclusion because the defined functions do not
include acts pertaining to plan design. 62 Because ERISA's fiduciary provi-

sions do not distinguish between welfare or pension plans, the Court decided

to extend Curtiss-Wright'sholding to the amendment of pension plans. 63 The

Court found that the defendant acted as a settlor, and not as a fiduciary, when
157.

Id. at 885-86. Specifically, the plaintiff accused the defendant of violating ERISA

§ 406(aXl)(D), which prohibits a fiduciary from using the plan in transactions that use plan
assets to benefit a party in interest. Id. at 886. Because the prohibited transaction rules govern
fiduciary actions, the court must find that the defendant acted as a fiduciary before these
applied.
158. Id. TheNinth Circuit Court ofAppeals found the plan amendments unlawful because
ERISA prohibits a fiduciary from using a benefits plan to benefit another party in interest. Id.
Because the defendant provided financial incentives in exchange for a waiver of employment
claims, the company used "[pllan assets to 'purchase' a significant benefit for Lockheed." Id.
159. See id. at 891 (finding defendant acted as settlor, and not fiduciary, when it amended
retirement plan).
160. Id. at 889. ERISA § 406(aXl)(D) governs fiduciary actions; therefore, to recover
under this provision the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted as a fiduciary when it
entered into the prohibited transaction. Id.at 888.
161. See id. at 890 (finding that employers act as settlors of trust when adopting, amending, or terminating benefits plans (citing Johnson v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 19 F.3d 1184, 1188 (7th
Cir. 1994))).
162. See id. (determining fiduciary definition does not include plan design thereby finding
amending actions not subject to fiduciary review (quoting Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program,
Unisys, 47 F.3d 498,505 (2d Cir. 1995))).
163. See id. at 891 ("Given ERISA's definition of fiduciary and the applicability of the
duties that attend that status, we think the rules regarding fiduciary capacity - including the
settler-fiduciary distinction - should apply to pension and welfare plans alike."). ERISA
requires welfare plan administrators to abide by the reporting and disclosure requirements,
fiduciary duty provisions, and the enforcement and remedial sections, but excludes them from
complying with vesting and funding requirements. See LANGBEIN & WoIY, supranote 108, at
176 (discussing ERISA's requirements regarding welfare benefit plans).
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it amended its employee benefits plan, therefore the plaintiff could not recover
damages under ERISA fiduciary obligations." Thus, under Lockheed, an
employer is not subject to fiduciary provisions when amending employee
benefits plans.
C. The Application of Two Hats Doctrine
The two hats doctrine supports two arguments against an affirmative fiduciary duty on employers to disclose proposed changes in employee benefits
plans. First, courts can not impose an affirmative fiduciary duty on employers
to disclose proposed changes because they are acting as settlors, and not as
fiduciaries, whenthey amend benefit plans. 6 Second, an affirmative fiduciary
duty disturbs ERISA's legislative balance by interfering with an employer's
ability to make fundamental business decisions. 6
1. Employer Acting as Settlor
Because an employer acts as a settlor and not as a fiduciary when it
amends a benefit plan, courts cannot subject an employer to an affirmative
fiduciary dutyto disclose proposed plan amendments. An affirmative fiduciary
duty to disclose proposed changes ignores ERISA's distinction between acting
as an employer and acting as aplan administrator. 67 Inthe Varity decision, the
Supreme Court, in dictum, recognized this distinction. 6 8 Relying on the
Curtiss-Wrightholding, Varity attempted to argue that amending its employee
benefits plan was not an act of plan administration to which fiduciary duties
attach.169 The Court recognized the validity of the defendant's argument, but
acknowledged a distinction between amending a plan and making statements
about the fiture ofthe plan."' Although fiduciary duties may not attach when
164. Id.
165. See infra Part IV.C.1 (recognizing inherent fallacy of imposing fiduciary duties on
employer acting as settlor).
166. See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing employer's ability to make fundamental business
decisions).
167. See supranote 125 (emphasizing that critical fallacy in Ninth Circuit's panel opinion
in Bins I, 189 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1999), was its failure to recognize that employers do not act
as fiduciaries when amending benefits plans).
168. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 505 (1996) ("While it may be true that
amending or terminating a plan... is beyond the power of a plan administrator... and, therefore, cannot be an act of plan 'management' or 'administration' - it does not follow that making
statements about the likely future of the plan is also beyond the scope of plan administration.").
169. Id. The Supreme Court decided Varity after deciding Curtiss-Wright, but before it
handed down its Lockheed decision.
170. Id.
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an employer amends a plan, the Varity Court emphasized that when a plan
administrator speaks, she must speak truthfiflly.7
It is this distinction between amending a plan and speaking about a plan
that lead the en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse the panel's
Bins I decision that an employer has an affirmative duty to disclose proposed
changes in employee benefits programs.172 The en banc court held that an
employer does not have an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in
employee benefit plans. 73 Looking at the detailed definition of a fiduciary,
the Bins H court found that the act of amending a plan is not an act of plan

management or administration; therefore, an employer's "serious consideration" of a plan amendment does not implicate ERISA's fiduciary duties. 74
Drawing a firm distinction between settlor and fiduciary functions, the en
bane court emphasized that when an employee inquires about prospective plan
changes, the employer has a duty to respond accurately and completely. 75
Under this standard, the en banc court emphasized that it was an employer's
communication, and not consideration, that triggered the fiduciary duty to
disclose proposed changes in employee benefit plans.
Courts have recognized the distinction discussed by the en bane Bins HI
court throughout the development ofthe two hats doctrine. In Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. 76 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first
court to distinguish between acting as an employer when amending a plan and
acting a fiduciary when discussing the future of a plan."' In Berlin, the
171. See id. (holding intentional misrepresentations about future of plan benefits is act of
plan administration).
172. Bins 11,220 F3d 1042, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000).
173. Id. at 1045 ("In the absence of an employee inquiry, however, the employer-fiduciary
does not have an affirmative duty to volunteer information about any changes prior to their final
adoption.").
174. See id. at 1053 ("The act of amending, or considering the amending of, a plan is
beyond the power of a plan administrator and thus is not an act of plan management or administration." (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 505 (1996))).
175. Id.
176.
858 F.2d 1154 (6th Cir. 1988).
177. See Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1164 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting
defendant did not have to disclose anything about future availability of proposed benefits, but
when choosing to communicate defendant must do so in straightforward manner). The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether a company served in a fiduciary capacity when it
allegedly made material misrepresentations regarding the future of its early retirement program.
Id. at 1162. In 1980 and 1982, the defendant offered early retirement incentives to management
employees to reduce its workforce. Id. at 1157. During the interim period between offerings,
the plaintiffs maintain that the defendant made intentional misrepresentations that the company
would not offer a second early retirement program to encourage employees to voluntarily retire
without extra financial incentives. Id. at 1158-59. Excusing the defendant of liability, the district court found that deciding to offer an early retirement option was a business decision that
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defendant offered an early retirement option for individuals retiring within a

three-month period and then repeated the same option two years later for a

two-month period. 7 '

The plaintiffs, employees who retired in the years

between the two offerings, brought an action against the defendant for breaching its fiduciary duty by making material misrepresentations about the future
availability of the early retirement option.1" 9 According to the district court,
no fiduciary duties applied because the company acted in a business capacity
when it made the decision to offer early retirement benefits.8 0
Reversing the district court, the court of appeals distinguished the nonfiduciary act of making business decisions from the fiduciary act of communieating information to plan participants.' 8 ' The court of appeals recognized
that an employer maintains an ability to make purely business decisions
without complying with a duty of loyalty to plan participants because it is not
acting in a fiduciary capacity." Then, the court qualified this standard by

asserting that fiduciaries always have a duty of
loyalty not to mislead plan
83

participants through material communications.
According to the court, the duty not to mislead does not impose a "duty
of clairvoyance" on employers to predict the future of employee benefits
plans, nor do employers have an affirmative duty to communicate anything
employers make without fiduciary duty responsibilities. Id. at 1160-61. The court of appeals
reversed the district court opinion by distinguishing between making business decisions and
communicating to employees about the future of their employee benefit programs. Id.at 116364. Although employers have the freedom to make business decisions, they must comply with
fiduciary duties of loyalty when discussing the potential outcome of those decisions with plan
participants. Id.
178. Id. at 1157-59. During a time of financial difficulty, the company sought to decrease
its expenses by creating an early retirement incentives to downsize management personnel. Id.
at 1157.
179. Id. at 1156. The plaintiffs alleged that, between early retirement offerings, the plan
administrator made several statements aimed at intentionally misleading them into believing that
the company would not offer another early retirement plan. Id.at 1158. The standard response
to employees' inquiries was that "a general [early retirement] application was unlikely and those
who were ready to retire should retire" and should not delay decisions based on the possibility
of a second offering. Id at 1159. According to the plaintiffs, the plan administrator made these
statements with the intent to induce its employees to act on the material misrepresentations and
voluntarily retire. Id. at 1160.
180. Id. at 1161. The plaintiffs attempted to argue that the court should draw a distinction
between "the actual corporate decision to offer benefits and communications made by fiduciaries to potential plan participants about the likelihood of a second implementation or offering."
Id. However, the district court rejected this assertion as illogical Id.
181. Id. at 1164.
182. See id. at 1163 ("ERISA employers may wear two hats and assume fiduciary status
only when functioning in their capacity as plan administrators, not when conducting business."
(quoting Amato v. W. Union Int'l, 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-1417 (2d Cir. 1985))).
183. Id. at 1163.
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about the future availability of early retirement programs.1 4 However, when
the employer decides to communicate material information to plan partici-

pants about an early retirement program, the plan administrator has a duty to

represent the situation accurately.'8 5 This decision provided the foundation
for federal jurisprudence that addressed the duty to disclose within the early
retirement context and distinguished between an employer who makes misrepand an employer who does not disclose information on his own
resentations
186
initiative.
The two hats distinction recognized in Bins 11 and Berlin between communicating about proposed changes and considering proposed changes is supported by ERISA's textual provisions. Because ERISA has a functional
definition of fiduciary, a court must conclude that an employer acts in a fiduciary capacity before holding it to fiduciary standards.' 87 Although communicating about a plan is an act of administration, the Supreme Court specifically
8
Therefore, a
has stated that amending a plan is not a fiduciary finction."'
court may not impose on affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose proposed
changes on an employer while it amends its benefits plan.' 9 Imposing such a
184. Id. at 1164.
185. See id. ("[I]f the plan administrator... does communicate with potential plan participants afterseriousconsiderationhas been given concerning a future implementation or offering
under the plan, then any material misrepresentations may constitute a breach of their fiduciary
duties.").
186. See Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 1996) ("While Nynex had a
fiduciary duty not to make affirmative misrepresentations or omissions, it did not have a duty
to disclose proposed changes in the absence of inquiry by Pocchia."); Wilson v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Plan fiduciaries are not obligated under
ERISA to provide information to potential plan beneficiaries about possible future [early
retirement] offerings .... If a fiduciary chooses to provide such information about the
future... it has a duty not to make misrepresentations about any future offering."); Mullins v.
Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding fiduciaries do not have to disclose
internal business operations but they must speak truthfully); Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994
F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that plaintiffs concede that business "had the right as an
employer to make the business decision of how much and when to enhance pension benefits,
but... also... an obligation under ERISA to tell the truth about such decisions when asked
by plan participants"); Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992) ("A
fiduciary must give complete and accurate information in response to participants' questions,
a duty that does not require the fiduciary to disclose its internal deliberations nor interfere with
the substantive aspects of the bargaining process."); Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d
1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Under ERISA, purely business decisions by an ERISA employer
are not governed by section 1104's fiduciary standards.").
187. See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text (explaining functional definition of
fiduciary).
188. See supra Part IV.B (discussing Supreme Court's application of two hats doctrine).
189. See supraPart IV.C.1 (discussing distinction between fiduciary act of communicating
about plan and non-fiduciary act of amending plan).
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duty not only violates ERISA's fiduciary provisions, but also disrupts the
statute's goal of encouraging employers to develop pension plans.
2. ProtectingThe FundamentalBusiness Decision
Because ofthe voluntary nature of the private pension system, Congress
drafted ERISA by balancing the primary goal of protecting employees' interests with the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs." The two hats
doctrine is a prime example of the compromise that Congress drafted into
ERISA1 91 To protect employee benefits, Congress required employers to serve
as fiduciaries while acting in three specific capacities; however, to encourage
the development of employee benefits plans, Congress permitted an employer
to shed its fiduciary hat and wear its settlor hat when amending or terminating
benefits plans."9 Congress realized that imposing a fiduciary duty of loyalty
on employers at all times would discourage the development of pension plans
by making the costs ofmaintaining the program too burdensome.19 3 Likewise,
an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in benefits programs would
frustrate the normal decision making processes of a business and impede a
company's ability to achieve legitimate business goals' 94
190. See H.R. REP.No. 533,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1,reprintedin1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4639 ("The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights, but the
committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature ofprivate retirement plans.");
Brauch, supra note 26, at 1291 (describing outcome of legislative process as ERISA "bargain").
191.. Two weeks after President Ford signed ERISA into law, Senator Jacob K. Javits
described the legislative balance:
The problem, as perceived by those who were with me on the this issue in Congress, was how to maintain the voluntary growth of private pension plans while at
the same time making needed structural reforms... so as to safeguard workers
against loss of their earned or anticipated benefits .... [The] new law represents
an overall effort to strike a balance between the clearly-demonstrated needs of
workers for greater protection and the desirability of avoiding the homogenization
of pension plans into a federally-dictated structure that would discourage voluntary
initiatives for further expansion and improvement.
Gordon, supra note 23, at 77.
192. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520
U.S. 510, 515 (1997) ("The flexibility an employer enjoys to amend or eliminate its welfare plan
is not an accident.... ").
193. See Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 505 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The
exemption of an employer's plan design decisions from fiduciary review is a necessary part of
ERISA's legislative balance."); 120 CoNG. REc. S15, 758 (1974) ("[lit is importantto recognize
that if minimum standards are set too high we would discourage the creation of new plans.");
supra Part IVA (discussing Congress's goal of containing pension costs).
194. See Bins I, 189 F.3d 929,943 (9th Cir. 1999) (Fernandez, J., dissenting) ("Today we
move further from the policy of 'encouraging the formation of employee benefits plans."'
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In Inter-ModalRail Employees Ass 'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co.,195 a unanimous Supreme Court, in dicta, emphasized an employer's right to make fundamental business decisions. 96 After discussing the
freedom employers maintain to amend and eliminate benefit programs," 9 the
Court asserted that ERISA provided employers with the flexibility to make
fundamental business decisions.s This conclusion justifies many federal
(quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987))), rev'd en banc,220 F.3d 1042
(9th Cir. 2000); Bintz, supra note 9, at 997-98 (arguing affirmative duties to disclose proposed
changes in employee benefits programs unduly burden plan sponsors). Bintz effectively argued
that deriving an affirmative duty to disclose from trust law unduly burdens employers, discourages the adoption and amendment of benefit plans, and "go[es] well beyond the amount of
disclosure needed to protect participants' interests." Id. at 997. According to Bintz, an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes would disrupt an employer's decision making process
and frustrate its ability to achieve legitimate business goals. Id. He argued that this disruption
may deter employers from offering employee benefit plans. Id. at 998.
195.
520 U.S. 510 (1997).
196. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520
U.S. 510, 516 (1997) (finding that fundamental business decisions affecting employee benefits
plans do not give rise to § 510 cause of action). In Inter-Modal,the Supreme Court considered
whether ERISA § 510 precluded a cause of action for interference with welfare benefits because
they do not vest like pension benefits. Id. at 512. Inter-Modal defendant, Santa Fe Terminal
Services, Inc. (SFTS), a wholly owned subsidiary of the defendant Atchison, Topeka and Santa
Fe Railway Company (ATSF), employed the plaintiffs to transfer cargo from railcars to trucks.
Id. After fifteen years of service, ATSF decided to contract out the "inter-modal" work to InTerminal Services (ITS) and gave the plaintiffs the option of working for the new company or
terminating their employment. Id. Because transferring from SFTS to ITS meant accepting a
deduction in pension and welfare benefits, the plaintiffs brought a claim against its employer
under ERISA § 510 for discharging participants with the intent to interfere with the attainment
of employee benefit rights. Id. at 513.
The district court dismissed the action, but the court of appeals reinstated the plaintiffs'
claim regarding pension benefits, but not welfare benefits. Id. Distinguishing the two types of
plans, the court of appeals noted that employers maintain the ability to amend welfare plans,
therefore plan participants do not have a future right to welfare benefits which is a prerequisite
to § 510 relief. Id. at 513-14. The Supreme Court disregarded the distinction between the two
types of employee benefits because the ERISA definition of "plan" included in § 510 refers to
both welfare and pension benefit plans. Id. at 514-15. In addition, the Court emphasized the
flexibility an employer maintains to amend or eliminate benefit plans. Id. at 515. Finally, the
Court emphasized an employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions. Id. at 516.
197. See id. at 515 ("Giving employers this flexibility also encourages them to offer more
generous benefits at the outset, since they are free to reduce benefits should economic conditions sour. If employers were locked into the plans they initially offered, 'they would err
initially on the side of omission."' (quoting Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir.
1995))).
198. Id. at 516. The Court qualified an employer's ability to make fundamental business
decisions by requiring that they follow amendment procedures and that they not be motivated
by a desire to harm plan participants for the purpose of interfering with their rights under the
plan. Id.
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decisions supporting an employer's ability to make important business deci-

sions without fiduciary restraint.1"

In Siskind v. Sperry Retirement Program, Unisys,2" the Second Circuit

Court of Appeals addressed how ERISA's two hats doctrine provided employ-

ers with the latitude to make fundamental business decisions." 1 Following a
corporate merger, the defendant offered early retirement incentives to some
of its benefits plan participants in an effort to streamline certain company
divisions. 2" Some of the excluded participants brought an action against the
company for breaching its fiduciary duties by delegating amendment authority
to the new corporate management. 2 3 The district court granted the plaintiff's
judgment finding that the defendant breached its fidumotion for summary
2 4
ciary duties.
The court of appeals reversed the decision, because the district court
overlooked Congress's goal of affording employers a degree of control when
designing pension plans.2 "5 The court determined that Congress purposefully
199. See Pochia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding pre-adoption
disclosure impairs achievement of legitimate -business goals); Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1993) ("A fiduciary must give complete and accurate information
in response to participants' questions, a duty that does not require the fiduciary to disclose its
internal deliberations nor interfere with the substantive aspects of the bargaining process.");
Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Under ERISA, purely
business decisions by an ERISA employer are not governed by section 1104's fiduciary
standards."); see also Bins I, 189 F.3d 929, 942 (9th Cir. 1999) (Fernandez, J., dissenting)
("Today we move further from the policy of 'encouraging the formation of employee benefit
plans."' (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987))), rev 'den banc, 220
F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000); Siskind v. Sperry Ret Program, 47 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 1995)
(emphasizing employers' abilities to make fundamental business decisions); 120 CoNG. REC.
S15,758 (1974) ("[I]t is important to recognize that if minimum standards are set too high we
would discourage the creation of new plans."); infra notes 200-54 and accompanying text
(presenting cases refusing to expand fiduciary duties to limit employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions).
200. 47 F.3d 498 (2d Cir. 1995).
201.
See Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 505 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The
exemption of an employer's plan design decisions from fiduciary review is a necessary part of
ERISA's legislative balance.").
202. Id. at 501.
203. Id. at 502. The plan documents designated the Sperry Corporation Employee Benefits
Executive Committee (the Committee) with the sole authority to amend the employee benefits
plan. Id. at 501. According to the plaintiffs, the Committee wrongfully delegated the authority
to determine the eligibility of early retirement benefits to corporate management, thereby
breaching its fiduciary duties. Id. at 502. According to the district court, the new management
proposed the exclusions and the Committee adopted the amendments. Id. This constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty because the Committee had a fiduciary duty to design as well as adopt
amendments to the plan. Id.
204. Id.
205. Seei at 501 ("[T]he trial court overlooked one ofCongress' aims in enacting ERISA-
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excluded plan design from ERISA's functional definition of a fiduciary to
preserve ERISA's legislative balance between securing pension rights and
encouraging employers to offer private retirement plans. 2" Because single
employer plans require company officers to act in the interest of both plan
participants and the employer,207 the court found that ERISA permitted
company officials to make business decisions regarding employee benefits
plans without breaching their fiduciary responsibilities to plan participants."
Thus, the court concluded that the defendant was not acting in a fiduciary
capacity and, therefore, had the right to act in the best interest of the company

when amending its pension plan.2"

Consistent with the holding in Siskind, many federal courts have found
that an affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in benefits programs
would frustrate an employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions
regarding early retirement incentives.2"' In Pocchiav. Nynex Corp.211 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted the typical early retirement

scenario.

Seven months after the Pocchia plaintiff retired, the defendant

that is, to afford employers designing pension plans a degree of flexibility and control.").
206. See id. at 505 ("Had ERISA subjected employer's amendments to stringent review,
employers would have been less willing to create retirement plans."). The court's analysis began
by recognizing that employers who design, amend, or terminate benefits plans do not come
within ERISA's definition of fiduciary. Id. According to the court, exempting design functions
from the fiduciary definition perpetuated ERISA's legislative balance. Id. When adopting
ERISA, Congress's twin goals were furthering the formation of retirement plans and protecting
individual pension rights. Id. Therefore, the court determined that placing excessive fiduciary
duties on business decisions would decrease employers' interest in maintaining benefits plans.
Id.

207. Id. at 506-07. In single employer plans, like the defendant's benefits plan, the plan
administrators are also corporate officers. Id. at 506. Viewing the employer as a plan participant, the court argued the employer and plan participants have similar interests in protecting
future benefits and using the benefits plan to contribute to business profitability. Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that corporate officers, serving as administrators, have duties to the
corporation as well as duties to plaintiffs as beneficiaries. Id. at 507.
208. See id. at 507 (discussing employers' ability to make business decisions).
[T]he trustees of a single employer pension plan may conduct business on behalf
of the employer in their capacities as corporate officers, and to the extent that such
business is not regulated by ERISA, they may act without invoking their fiduciary
duties to plan beneficiaries. For purposes of enacting an amendment regarding plan
design, the plan trustees stand in the shoes of the employer.
Id.

209. Id.
210. See supraPart I (describing early retirement context in hypothetical); see also Bintz,
supra note 9, at 997 (showing how affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes is problematic).
211. 81 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 1996).
212. See Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1996) (summarizing background of dispute). In Pocchia, the court determined whether, absent employee inquiry,
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offered an early retirement plan that entitled participants to enhanced retirement benefits. 213 Ineligible for the early retirement benefits, the plaintiff
brought an action against the defendant for breach of fiduciary duty for failing
214
to disclose that the company planned to implement an early retirement plan.
After the district court granted the defendant's motion for summaryjudgement
the court of appeals considered whether fiduciaries have a duty to volunteer
information about proposed amendments to employee benefits plans.1 5
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision not to support
an affirmative duty to disclose by emphasizing an employer's ability to make
business decisions.2 16 First, the court determined that voluntary disclosure
prior to adoption would confuse beneficiaries and unduly burden management
with the responsibility of determining exactly when the duty to disclose
arose.217 Next, the court emphasized that pre-adoption disclosure impairs
legitimate business objectives. 218 Finally, the court found that maintaining the
secrecy of internal discussions and deliberations regarding prospective business decisions does not frustrate ERISA's purpose of ensuring that employees
have sufficient information.219 Because ERISA allows employers to make
fundamental business decisions, the court found that they do not have an
obligation to disclose proposed changes to retirement programs before they
are adopted. 2 ° Like the court in Pocchia, many federal courts rejected an
employers had a duty voluntarily to disclose proposed changes in employee benefits. Id. After
Pocchia voluntarily resigned from his position, his former employer offered an early retirement
plan. Id. Ineligible to participate in the plan, Pocchia brought a breach of fiduciary duty action
against his former employer for failing to inform him of the proposed plan. Id. at 278. The
district court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion and the court of appeals
affirmed, concluding that an employer is not required to disclose proposed changes in employee
benefits on its own initiative. Id. The court refrained from developing an affirmative fiduciary
duty to disclose because it infringed on the defendant's ability to make legitimate business
decisions. Id. at 278-79.
213. Id. at277.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 278.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 278-79. The court posited a scenario in which a business, seeking to reduce its
workforce, considers whether to offer an enhanced early retirement plan if necessary reductions
do not occur through voluntary resignations. However, if fiduciaries maintained a duty to
disclose the business strategy, it would fail because employees would not voluntarily retire if
they knew that improved benefits were planned if workforce reductions did not succeed. See
id. at 279 (articulating early retirement scenario (citing Bintz, supranote 9, at 997)).
219. See id. at 279 ('[A] bright line rule protects the interests of beneficiaries, who will
receive information at the earliest point at which their rights can possibly be affected.").
220. Id. at 278; see also Bettis v. JJ. Thompson, 932 F. Supp. 173, 176 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
(denying fiduciary duty to disclose in early retirement context by stating that "[tihe only duty
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affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in employee benefits plans
because they recognized the importance of giving employers the freedom to
make business decisions related to workforce reductions. 1 These federal
courts recognized the relationship between containing pension costs and
ERISA's goal of encouraging employers to provide pension plans.
The courts in Siskind and Pocchia recognized that Congress's goal of
protecting pension benefits was balanced by a desire to contain administrative
costs to encourage employers to develop pensionplans. 2 InInter-Modal,the
Supreme Court emphasized that ERISA's two hats doctrine contains administrative costs by outlining when an employer must serve as a fiduciary and when
it can act in its own interests.'
More specifically, federal jurisprudence
supports the conclusion that ERISA provides employers with the flexibility to
make fundamental business decisions such as whether to amend their employee
benefits plans. 4 An affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes protects
employee benefits by infringing on an employer's ability to make important
business decisions. 2' Consequently, courts should not impose this type of
obligation because it is not in accordance with the goal of ERISA to promote
the development of employee benefit plans.
V Analysis
Requiring employers to provide information to plan participants regard-

ing proposed plan amendments on their own initiative: (1) violates ERISA
a corporation has to employees is accurately to explain the current state of affairs about the
pensions plan then in effect.").
221. See Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding pre-adoption
disclosure impairs legitimate business goals); Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d
399, 406 (8th Cir. 1995) (determining employers are not required to provide general business
information to plan participants); Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994)
(concluding fiduciaries do not have to disclose internal business operations but they must speak
truthfully); Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1993) (conceding that
business "had the right as an employer to make the business decision of how much and when
to enhance pension benefits but. . . also... an obligation under ERISA to tell the truth about
such decisions when asked by plan participants"); Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246,
251 (6th Cir. 1993) ("A fiduciary must give complete and accurate information in response to
participants' questions, a duty that does not require the fiduciary to disclose its internal deliberations nor interfere with the substantive aspects of the bargaining process."); Berlin v. Mich.
Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Under ERISA, purely business decisions
by an ERISA employer are not governed by section 1104's fiduciary standards.").
222. See supra notes 200-21 and accompanying text (discussing Siskind and Pocchia
decisions).
223. See supranotes 195-99 and accompanying text (presenting Inter-Modaldecision).
224. See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing ability of employers to make fundamental business
decisions).
225. See supra notes 210-21 (presenting cases refusing to infringe on employer's ability
to make fundamental business decisions).
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because it imposes fiduciary duties on an employer who does not act in a
fiduciary capacity, and (2) disrupts ERISA's legislative balance by unreasonably infringing on an employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions. Like all statutes, ERISA is the product of legislative compromise.2
In this case, Congress wanted to protect employee benefits and to contain
administrative costs.' This balance not only protects current benefits, but
also encourages employers to offer pension and welfare benefits to more
employees, consequently increasing the amount of people with additional
retirement income and health insurance. This legislative compromise is
inherent in all of ERISA's provisions.
ERISA's disclosure provisions aim to provide employees with information so they can fully understand their rights under their benefits plan.' The
disclosure provisions are very specific and do not require an employer to
disclose proposed amendments to employee benefits programs. 2" The fiduciary duty provisions seek to prevent plan administrators from abusing their
discretion by requiring them to act solely in the interest of the plan participants.Y0 However, Congress did not intend to require an employer, who may
also serve as a plan administrator, always to act in the best interest ofthe plan
beneficiaries. 1 To ease the administrative burdens of employers, Congress
required an individual to abide by fiduciary responsibilities "to the extent" that
she serves in one of the three fiduciary capacities. 2 This is an important
limitation to the fiduciary provisions that the federal courts can not ignore.
Congress did intend the federal courts to interpret ERISA's fiduciary
duty provisions in accordance with the common law of trusts.2 33 Moreover,
the federal courts have used trust law to require plan administrators to provide
complete and accurate current plan information on their own initiative and to
provide truthful information regarding "seriously considered" potential plan
amendments in response to employee inquiry." Yet, courts can not use trust
law to require employers to provide information regarding "seriously consid226. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text (discussing legislative compromise).
227. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text (discussing legislative compromise).
228. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text (discussing pre-ERISA interest in
disclosure and ERISA's disclosure rules).
229. See supraPart ILB (outlining ERISA's disclosure provisions).
230. See supraPart 1LC (presenting ERISA's fiduciary provisions).
231. See supranotes 135-49 and accompanying text (describing two hats doctrine).
232. See supra notes 143-45 (discussing "to the extent" limitation on ERISA's fiduciary
definition).
233. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's intention for
courts to interpret fiduciary duties through common law of trusts).
234. See supra Part BfI (presenting development of ERISA fiduciary duties through trust
principles).
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ered" proposed plan amendments on their own volition because employers do
not act as fiduciaries when amending employee benefits plans 35
Before a court can impose fiduciary duties on an employer, it must ensure
that the employer is acting in a fiduciary capacity. 23 ERISA's functional
definition of "fiduciary" prevents a court from extending its fiduciary duty to
disclose to an employer in the act of amending its benefit plan.Y 7 Communicating to an employee about her benefits plan is an act of plan administration;
therefore, fiduciary duties attach when an administrator speaks."3 Considering whether to amend an employee benefits plan is not an act of plan administration, but an act of plan design.3 9 Because ERISA's functional definition
of a fiduciary does not include designing a plan, fiduciary duties do not attach
to an employer when it acts in this capacity. 24' A court that requires an
employer to provide information regarding seriously considered proposed plan
amendments of its own volition ignores ERISA's functional fiduciary definition, ERISA's legislative history, and the Supreme Court's conclusion that
fiduciary duties do not attach when an employer amends a benefits plan.
As discussed above, ERISA's legislativehistory emphasizesthat Congress
balanced the primary purpose of protecting employee benefits with the goal of
containing pension costs. 2 4 1 Congress recognized the high costs of requiring
employers to act "solely in the interest" of plan beneficiaries when designing
and amending benefits plans and specifically excluded those functions from the
fiduciary provisions. Deciding whether to amend an employee benefits plan is
a fundamental business decision that requires employers to consider a variety
of factors.242 A court that imposes an affirmative duty to disclose proposed
changes on employers must maintain thatthe act of amending a benefits plan is
a fiduciary function.243 If amending a plan is a fiduciary function, then the
235. See supraPart IV (developing two hats doctrine).
236. See supra Part IV.B (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence requiring lower courts
to determine whether employer acts as fiduciary before attaching fiduciary duties).
237. See supraPart V.C.1 (discussing application of two hats doctrine).
238. See supra notes 167-86 and accompanying text (presenting cases that distinguish

between
239.
between
240.

fiduciary act of communicating about plan and non-fiduciary act of amending plan).
See supra notes 167-86 and accompanying text (presenting cases that distinguish
fiduciary act of communicating about plan and non-fiduciary act of amending plan).
See supra notes 167-86 and accompanying text (presenting cases that distinguish

between fiduciary act of communicating about plan and non-fiduciary act of amending plan).
241.

See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing how to protect employer's ability to make funda-

mental business decisions).
242. See supra notes 200-25 and accompanying text (presenting cases that preserve employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions).
243. See supra notes 200-25 and accompanying text (presenting cases that preserve em-

ployer's ability to make fundamental business decisions).
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secondary costs ofmaintaining a pension plan greatly increase because employers will have to make all decisions regarding plan design solely in the interests
ofthe beneficiaries.244 Hence, an affirmative dutyto disclose proposed changes
disrupts ERISA's legislative goal ofcontaining pension costs bygreatly inhibiting an employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions.24 Consequently, courts should not extend fiduciary duties to include an affirmative
obligation to disclose proposed changes because itviolates ERISA and destroys
its legislative balance.
V. Conclusion
The federal courts must recognize thattheir authority to inteipret ERISA's
fiduciary provisions through the law of trusts is not absolute, but limited by
the text of the statute.246 Congress spent more than two decades researching,
drafting, and redrafting the legislation that federalized pension law; therefore,
the courts should perpetuate the goals Congress sought to achieve and decide
legal controversies in accordance with ERISA's provisions. To abide by these
principles, the federal courts can not impose on employers an affirmative duty
to disclose proposed changes in employee benefits programs.
ERISA permits a company to serve in a dual capacity as both employer
and plan administrator. When an employer chooses to communicate with an
employee regarding potential plan benefits, ERISA's fiduciary standards
require her to provide complete and accurate material information about the
current plan and seriously considered proposed amendments. However, when
an employer makes a fundamental business decision to amend its employee
benefits plan it is serving in a fiduciary capacity and is therefore not subject
to a fiduciary duty of disclosure.
It is plain to see why the Bins Ipanel and various practitioners feel compelled to develop an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose proposed changes
in benefits programs. It is natural to feel sympathy for the employee who
retired "one month too soon" to reap the financial benefits of a subsequent
early retirement program.247 However, a court does not have the authority to
244. See supra notes 200-25 and accompanying text (presenting cases that preserve employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions).
245. See supra notes 200-25 and accompanying text (presenting cases that preserve employer's ability to make fundamental business decisions).
246. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993) ("[Vjague notions of a
statute's 'basic purpose' are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding
the specific issue under consideration." (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496
U.S. 633,646-47 (1990))).
247. See VanderPloeg, supra note 3, at 292 (discussing understandable pain felt by employee who terminated employment only to discover that "ifthey had only known" they could
have left with better benefits).
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redraft federal pension legislation. An affimative duty to disclose proposed
changes in benefits programs directly contradicts ERISA's statutory language
and completely upsets ERISA's legislative balance of protecting employee
benefits and containing pension costs.24 Therefore, the federal courts should
refrain from imposing an affirmative fiduciary duty on employers to disclose
proposed changes in employee benefits programs.

248. See supra Part IV (discussing fallacies inherent in affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose proposed changes).
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